Gerrymandering Justiciability by Spann, Girardeau A
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2020 
Gerrymandering Justiciability 
Girardeau A. Spann 
 
 




This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States Commons 
Gerrymandering Justiciability 
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982  
I. GERRYMANDERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984  
A. PARTISAN POLITICAL QUESTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985  
B. RACIAL LEGAL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987  
II. INVERSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990  
A. PARTISAN LEGAL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991  
1. Doctrinal Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991  
2. Instrumental Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994  
a. Judicially Manageable Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995  
b. Representative Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997  
c. Standing. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999  
B. RACIAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001  
1. Doctrinal Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002  
2. Instrumental Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004  
a. No Legal Right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004  
b. Judicially Manageable Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006  
c. Relative Institutional Competence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008  
III. GERRYMANDERING JUSTICIABILITY .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009  
A. DILUTING MINORITY VOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010  
B. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COURT . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 
* James and Catherine Denny Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2020, 
Girardeau A. Spann. I would like to thank Amy Chau, Max Crema, Nathan Garg, Irv Gornstein, Lisa 
Heinzerling, Marty Lederman, Erin O’Neill, Mike Seidman, Paul Smith, Janae Staicer, David Vladeck, 
and the editors and staff of The Georgetown Law Journal for their help in developing the ideas 
expressed in this Article. Research for this Article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
981 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has gerrymandered its justiciability doctrines in a way that 
protects the political power of white voters. Comparing the Court’s willingness to 
find racial gerrymanders justiciable with its refusal to find partisan gerrymanders 
justiciable reveals a lack of doctrinal constraint. That gives the Court the discre-
tionary power to uphold or strike down particular gerrymanders by deeming them 
racial or partisan in nature. Such discretion is problematic because, when the 
Supreme Court has exercised discretion in a racial context, it has historically 
done so to protect the interests of the white majority. And that appears to be what 
the Court is now doing again in allowing white Republicans to dilute the political 
power of minority Democrats. 
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court treated the constitutionality of 
partisan gerrymandering as nonjusticiable, thereby allowing voting districts to be 
created with the predominant intent of ensuring a desired political makeup.1 In 
Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court treated the constitutionality of racial gerryman-
dering as justiciable, thereby prohibiting voting districts from being created with 
the predominant intent of ensuring a desired racial makeup.2 But in Easley v. 
Cromartie, the Court held that what appears to be racial gerrymandering can 
actually constitute partisan gerrymandering.3 So how does the Court decide 
whether a particular gerrymander is nonjusticiably partisan or unconstitutionally 
racial? 
Normally, we would expect the Court to ascertain the actual intent underlying 
adoption of the gerrymander at issue. But that is precisely what Rucho indicates 
the Court lacks the constitutional jurisdiction to do under the political question 
doctrine that emanates from the Article III case-or-controversy requirement.4 The 
correlation between race and politics is so high that no judicially manageable 
standard is available to distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, the Court 
must be doing something when it rules on the constitutionality of particular gerry-
manders. This Article argues that, as American culture becomes increasingly 
diverse, and whites become increasingly anxious about the impending loss of 
their racial majority status, the Supreme Court appears to have gerrymandered its 
justiciability doctrines in a way that permits it to perform the social function of 
facilitating efforts by the white majority to preserve its existing political advant-
age over racial minorities. 
More specifically, Rucho holds that federal courts cannot prohibit partisan ger-
rymandering because the Constitution allocates the power to draw voting district  
1. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
3. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
4. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
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lines to the political branches of government.5 Even when states apportion legis-
latures in ways that intentionally give extreme and enduring partisan advantage 
to the ruling political party, the Article III political question doctrine makes that 
problem nonjusticiable in the federal courts.6 The lack of judicially ascertainable 
and manageable standards reveals that the Constitution has delegated the respon-
sibility to remedy such problems to political actors rather than to the federal 
courts. That is true despite the fact that partisan malapportionment can create 
structural defects that threaten the viability of democratic self-governance. 
But things are different where race is involved. Shaw shows that racial gerry-
manders are constitutionally justiciable where some voters are disadvantaged by 
voting district lines that intentionally give an electoral advantage to voters of a par-
ticular race.7 Not only do such claims of discrimination raise legal rather than polit-
ical questions, but disappointed voters possess Article III standing to have federal 
courts adjudicate their claims. Despite the abstract nature of such racial discrimina-
tion claims, they are sufficient to defeat justiciability objections. Like partisan mal-
apportionment, racial malapportionment can pose structural defects that threaten 
the viability of democratic self-governance. But this time the defects do matter. 
It turns out that the arguments on which the Supreme Court relies to support its 
justiciability distinctions between partisan and racial gerrymandering can be 
inverted in a way that supports the equally plausible conclusion that partisan gerry-
mandering claims are justiciable and racial gerrymandering claims are not. 
Moreover, both the original and the inverted applications of the justiciability rules 
seem equally faithful to the one-person-one-vote principle that activates our struc-
tural commitment to democratic self-governance. Once we recall Easley’s recog-
nition that judicially permissible partisan gerrymandering can look like judicially 
impermissible racial gerrymandering, the distinction between the two becomes 
quite elusive. Not only can the Supreme Court adopt whichever characterization 
advances its agenda in particular cases, but the Court can talk about one when its 
real goal is to affect the other. That lack of doctrinal constraint gives the Supreme 
Court considerable discretion in applying its justiciability rules, and the decided 
cases suggest that the Court will exercise its discretion in ways that protect the po-
litical advantage the waning white majority still possesses over racial minorities. 
In the context of gerrymandering, the Court’s justiciability rules typically pro-
duce judicial deference to the efforts of whites to maintain or accumulate elec-
toral power, but produce judicial intervention when racial minorities seek 
remedial apportionment to equalize electoral power. Accordingly, the Court 
defers on justiciability grounds in cases like Rucho, where the Republican major-
ity succeeds in marginalizing the electoral power of both Democrats and non- 
white voters. Although similar deference is also required in cases where 
Democratic majorities possess the power to engage in partisan gerrymandering, 
5. Id. at 2506. 
6. Id. at 2506–07. 
7. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657–58. 
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disproportionate Republican control of statehouses and governorships suggests 
that a deferential justiciability rule for partisan gerrymandering will provide a net 
benefit to Republicans and the white interests that they represent. 
In addition, the Supreme Court often has the option of making a Democratic 
gerrymander become justiciable by characterizing it as racial rather than partisan 
in nature. In cases like Shaw, where white electoral strength is reduced through 
the creation of majority-minority voting districts, the Court intervenes to hold 
those districts unconstitutional, finding them to be justiciable because they are 
racial gerrymanders. True, the Court will uphold some racial gerrymanders that 
benefit minorities, and invalidate some that benefit whites. But on balance, whites 
will derive a net benefit from treating racial gerrymanders as justiciable. And by 
gerrymandering the line that separates justiciable from nonjusticiable claims, the 
Supreme Court will have succeeded in helping whites to preserve the political 
advantage that they have over racial minorities. 
Part I of this Article describes the Supreme Court’s current justiciability rules 
for gerrymandering claims. Section I.A explains how the Court finds partisan ger-
rymandering claims to be nonjusticiable political questions. Section I.B explains 
how the Court finds racial gerrymandering claims to be justiciable. Part II inverts 
the Court’s justiciability rules, showing how they can be applied in a way that 
produces the opposite of the results that the Court found them to produce. Section 
II.A explains how partisan gerrymandering claims can be found justiciable. 
Section II.B explains how racial gerrymandering claims can be found nonjustici-
able. Part III argues that the Court’s gerrymandered justiciability decisions create 
a sphere of unconstrained judicial discretion that the Court will end up exercising 
in a way that protects white electoral advantage from the threat of equalization 
through either partisan or racial gerrymandering. Section III.A argues that the 
Court’s decisions have the effect of diluting minority votes and reducing minority 
voting strength. Section III.B argues that such protection of white interests is con-
sistent with the role that the Supreme Court has played throughout the history of 
race relations in the United States. The Article concludes that neither political nor 
judicial efforts are likely to secure electoral equality for either political or racial 
minorities, because the Supreme Court will not compel the mathematical propor-
tionality that offers the only realistic hope of ever achieving the equality needed 
for genuine democratic self-governance. 
I. GERRYMANDERING 
The practice of drawing voting district lines for partisan political advantage 
predates the Declaration of Independence. Named “gerrymandering” in 1812, af-
ter its use by Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry to favor Democratic- 
Republicans over Federalists in apportioning the state legislature, the practice is 
now a common technique for securing political power that exceeds one’s numeri-
cal voting strength.8 Two common forms of contemporary gerrymandering are: 
8. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494–95. 
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(1) partisan gerrymandering that seeks to secure electoral advantages for one’s 
preferred political party, and (2) racial gerrymandering that seeks to secure elec-
toral advantages for one’s preferred race. Gerrymandering is controversial 
because the vote dilution that it produces puts a strain on the principle of demo-
cratic self-governance. The Supreme Court has now ruled on the justiciability of 
both types of gerrymanders. 
A. PARTISAN POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
The Supreme Court’s long anticipated June 27, 2019 decision in Rucho v. 
Common Cause settled a nagging question in constitutional law.9 It held that the 
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion over which the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under the case-or- 
controversy provision of Article III.10 For a time, it looked as if earlier decisions, 
and the now-retired Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
might prompt the Roberts Court to find at least some partisan gerrymandering 
claims to be justiciable.11 However, writing for a 5–4 majority in Rucho, Chief 
Justice Roberts rejected that possibility. He realized that “such gerrymandering is 
‘incompatible with democratic principles,’”12 but he nevertheless found that exer-
cising judicial review over partisan gerrymandering would destroy “the very 
foundation of democratic decisionmaking.”13 
The case involved two partisan gerrymanders. The 2016 North Carolina party- 
line Republican gerrymander of congressional voting districts produced a delega-
tion of ten Republicans and three Democrats; notably, one of the Republican- 
districting committee chairs said “he did not believe it [would be] possible to 
draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.”14 In the prior 2014 election, 
Republican candidates had also won ten of thirteen House seats, despite having 
received only 55% of the total vote.15 A three-judge federal district court held 
that the North Carolina partisan gerrymander violated the First Amendment, the 
Equal Protection Clause, and the Article I, Section 2 requirement that 
Representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States.”16 Rucho’s com-
panion case, Lamone v. Benisek, involved a party-line, Democratic gerrymander 
in Maryland in 2011, which succeeded in achieving the Democratic Governor’s 
9. See id. at 2484. 
10. See id. at 2506–07. 
11. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125–27, 143 (1986) (finding a partisan gerrymandering claim justiciable under 
the Equal Protection Clause and rejecting the view that racial gerrymandering claims are distinguishable 
from partisan gerrymandering claims with respect to justiciability). 
12. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)). 
13. Id. at 2500 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
14. Id. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15. Id. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491–92 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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goal of using “the redistricting process to change the overall composition of 
Maryland’s congressional delegation to 7 Democrats and 1 Republican by flip-
ping one district.”17 In Maryland’s congressional elections from 2012 to 2018, 
Democrats won seven of eight House seats, despite never having won more than 
65% of the total vote.18 A three-judge federal district court held that the Maryland 
gerrymander violated the First Amendment.19 
In vacating the lower court decisions, Chief Justice Roberts stressed that “a ju-
risdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering,”20 and that “[t]o 
hold that legislators cannot take partisan interests into account when drawing dis-
trict lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust district-
ing to political entities.”21 The absence of “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for determining when partisan gerrymandering had gone 
too far indicated that the permissibility of partisan gerrymandering was a nonjus-
ticiable political question.22 Accordingly, the Elections Clause of Article I, 
Section 4, Clause 1 gives state legislatures the power to prescribe the “Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of Congress, and gives 
Congress itself the oversight power to “make or alter” any such regulations.23 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the suggestion that proportional representation 
could serve as a judicially manageable standard for adjudicating partisan gerry-
mandering claims. He quoted Court precedent: “Our cases, however, clearly fore-
close any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that 
legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible 
to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated 
statewide vote will be.”24 Roberts also rejected the suggestion that a judicially 
developed notion of “fairness” could serve as an operative standard, noting that 
imprecision and contending conceptions of fairness would fail to afford adequate 
constraint on the exercise of judicial discretion.25 
Roberts also found that the “one-person, one-vote” standard that applies to 
“vote dilution” claims does not readily transfer to the partisan gerrymandering 
context because the standard protects individual rights and not group rights.26 
Similarly, Roberts rejected use of the “predominant intent” standard that applies 
to racial gerrymandering claims because racial discrimination in voting is uncon-
stitutional unless it satisfies strict scrutiny.27 Unlike racial gerrymandering, 
17. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18. Id. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
19. See id. at 2493 (majority opinion). 
20. Id. at 2497 (emphasis added) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 2494 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986) (plurality 
opinion)). 
25. See id. at 2499–2501. 
26. See id. at 2501. 
27. See id. at 2502–03. 
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partisan gerrymandering is constitutional in the voting context where it is unreal-
istic to ask for the elimination of political partisanship.28 Roberts also rejected the 
suggestion that a “persistence” standard was judicially manageable, concluding 
that reviewing courts could easily make mistakes about how persistent the effects 
of a particular partisan gerrymander might turn out to be.29 
For Roberts, the First Amendment rights to free speech and association could 
not serve as a basis for justiciability because there is no evidence that partisan 
gerrymandering interferes with those rights, and the First Amendment does not 
provide any basis for determining when partisanship has gone too far.30 Using the 
degree of deviation from a state’s own districting criteria as a standard would 
also fail to work because those criteria could not only vary from state to state and 
year to year, but a reviewing court would still not know how much partisan devia-
tion from those criteria was permissible and how much was not.31 In other cases 
where judicial determinations are made as matters of degree, courts have other 
common law or statutory standards that they rely on for guidance.32 Roberts also 
found that the Article I, Section 2 and Section 4 provisions that describe the selec-
tion of members of the House of Representatives are not a source of justiciable 
standards.33 Although excessive partisan gerrymandering can place a strain on 
democratic self-governance, Roberts insisted that remedies for that problem must 
be political, and must come from Congress rather than the federal courts.34 
B. RACIAL LEGAL RIGHTS 
Unlike partisan gerrymandering, racial gerrymandering does give rise to justi-
ciable legal claims. In the 1993 case Shaw v. Reno, Justice O’Connor wrote an 
opinion for a 5–4 Court holding that racial gerrymandering could give adversely  
28. See id. Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts’s rejection of inquiries into intent applies only where a 
partisan and not a racial gerrymander is at issue. But the problem is that one may not be able to make that 
determination without such an inquiry. That seems to pose a self-referential paradox, emanating from the 
Easley v. Cromartie recognition that partisan gerrymandering can be mistaken for racial gerrymandering. 
See 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001). For justiciability purposes, the intent inquiries that a court would have to 
make in order to determine if a gerrymander was racial or partisan would seem to be the same as the 
inquiries that a court would have to make to determine whether a gerrymander was constitutional. 
One could argue that Chief Justice Roberts did not intend wholly to preclude inquiries into the intent 
of legislatures that adopt partisan gerrymanders, but only to deem such inquiries irrelevant. He does say, 
“But determining that lines were drawn on the basis of partisanship does not indicate that the districting 
was improper. A permissible intent—securing partisan advantage—does not become constitutionally 
impermissible, like racial discrimination, when that permissible intent ‘predominates.’” Rucho, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2502–03. However, this defense of Roberts’s approach ignores the fact that he is not merely 
saying that partisan gerrymandering intent is constitutionally permissible on the merits. He takes the 
further step of holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. That means that federal 
courts lack the jurisdiction even to consider the merits of partisan gerrymandering intent. 
29. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2503–04. 
30. See id. at 2504–05. 
31. See id. at 2505. 
32. See id. at 2505–06. 
33. See id. at 2506. 
34. See id. at 2506–08. 
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affected voters a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.35 In Shaw, 
the North Carolina legislature adopted a reapportionment plan that created two 
majority-minority voting districts—gerrymandered districts drawn so that a ma-
jority of the voters would be black.36 The majority-minority districts were 
adopted in response to pressure by the United States Attorney General, who made 
those districts a condition of granting preclearance for the reapportionment plan 
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.37 The Voting Rights Act sought 
to remedy the long history of voting discrimination in the United States, and the 
section 5 preclearance provision applied to North Carolina because of its history 
of racial discrimination in voting.38 Five white North Carolina voters, with ami-
cus support from the Republican National Committee, challenged the constitu-
tionality of the majority-minority districts, arguing that they were the product of 
racial discrimination that violated the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
rights of the white plaintiffs.39 A three-judge federal district court dismissed the 
challenge, finding no equal protection violation.40 But the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded.41 
In recognizing a new equal protection cause of action for white voters who 
challenged the creation of majority-minority voting districts, Justice O’Connor 
did not detect any justiciability problem. Seven years earlier, in Davis v. 
Bandemer, the Supreme Court had observed: “Our past decisions also make clear 
that even where there is no population deviation among the districts, racial gerry-
mandering presents a justiciable equal protection claim.”42 Citing Davis, Justice 
O’Connor assumed that racial gerrymanders remained justiciable.43 However, 
Justice O’Connor was quick to emphasize that not all racial gerrymanders would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. She said: 
This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is imper-
missible in all circumstances. What appellants object to is redistricting legisla-
tion that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed 
only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard 
for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling 
justification.44 
35. See 509 U.S. 630, 642–44, 649–50 (1993). 
36. See id. at 633. 
37. See id. at 634–35. 
38. See id. at 656. 
39. Id. at 635–36. 
40. Id. at 637. 
41. See id. at 658. Since Shaw was decided, the Roberts Court has effectively eliminated the section 5 
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act by holding that the section 4(b) formula for determining 
which jurisdictions are subject to section 5 preclearance is based on unconstitutionally stale data. See 
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–57 (2013). 
42. 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986). Although Davis went on to hold that partisan gerrymandering claims 
were also justiciable, see id. at 143, the Supreme Court rejected that holding in Rucho for lack of a 
judicially manageable standard. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501–02. 
43. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650 (discussing Davis, 478 U.S. at 118–27). 
44. Id. at 642. 
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Justice O’Connor also insisted that the claim she was recognizing in Shaw was 
analytically distinct from vote-dilution claims that had been rejected in prior 
cases. The Shaw claim was not about vote dilution, she explained, but rather was 
about segregating voters into particular voting districts on the basis of race.45 As 
a result of Shaw, racial gerrymanders could be upheld under the Equal 
Protection Clause only if they could survive the strict scrutiny applied to other 
racial classifications—something that the three-judge district court was to deter-
mine on remand.46 
Two years later, in Miller v. Johnson, the Court applied strict scrutiny to affirm 
a three-judge district court’s invalidation of a Georgia reapportionment plan con-
taining three majority-minority districts that had been created to secure Attorney 
General approval under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.47 Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Shaw had emphasized that some consideration of race remained per-
missible in the districting process.48 Writing for the same 5–4 majority as in 
Shaw, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Miller articulated the equal protec-
tion standard that was to be used in determining whether the consideration of race 
would be constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Participants in the districting process could be aware of racial demographics. 
However, the consideration of race was unconstitutional once it became the “pre-
dominant factor” motivating the districting decision.49 The consideration of race 
could not subordinate “traditional race-neutral districting principles, including 
but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions 
or communities defined by actual shared interests.”50 Justice O’Connor’s concur-
ring opinion in Miller emphasized that the “predominant factor” test was a high 
standard that would be difficult to satisfy in most cases. Accordingly, the standard 
did not “throw into doubt the vast majority of the Nation’s 435 congressional dis-
tricts,” even though race may have been a factor in their creation.51 
Neither the Shaw nor Miller opinions viewed justiciability as posing a signifi-
cant problem in the racial gerrymandering context. However, in United States v. 
Hays, decided the same year as Miller, the Court did hold that in order to have 
standing to assert a racial gerrymandering equal protection claim under Shaw, a 
plaintiff had to reside in the majority-minority voting district being challenged.52 
In her majority opinion for seven members of the Court, Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that “standing ‘is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] 
doctrines.’”53 Accordingly, four white plaintiffs who lived in a district that was 
45. See id. at 651–52. 
46. See id. at 657–58. 
47. See 515 U.S. 900, 920–28 (1995). 
48. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. 
49. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 928–29 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
52. See 515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995). 
53. Id. at 742 (alteration in original) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 
(1990) (citations omitted)). 
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adjacent to a majority-minority district did not have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the majority-minority district. Because they did not live in the 
racially gerrymandered majority-minority district, they could not claim any “rep-
resentational injury” from the fear that a minority legislator elected in that district 
would inadequately represent their interests. As a result, they did not demonstrate 
“the irreducible constitutional minimum” injury in fact that was necessary to es-
tablish standing.54 Even though redistricting plans could have attenuated effects 
on all residents of a state, residents who did not live in the challenged district 
were asserting a mere generalized grievance that was not sufficient for standing.55 
Rucho held that partisan gerrymandering is constitutionally nonjusticiable 
because the issues raised by such gerrymandering are political questions. They 
are not questions of legal right, which would be suitable for judicial enforcement 
under Article III, because they lack judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards to guide courts in their adjudications. Shaw and its progeny held that 
racial gerrymandering is justiciable because the issues raised by such gerryman-
dering are claims of legal right. Those rights are suitable for enforcement by fed-
eral courts because they do provide judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards to guide courts in their adjudications. But what if the Supreme Court 
has it exactly backwards? 
II. INVERSION 
It is relatively easy to formulate arguments that invert the Court’s Rucho and 
Shaw analyses and demonstrate that, actually, partisan gerrymandering claims 
are justiciable, and racial gerrymandering claims are not. And those arguments 
are at least as plausible as the arguments the Supreme Court has offered for its 
own pairings of gerrymandering and justiciability. On a doctrinal level, the inver-
sion can be accomplished simply by accepting the interpretations of ambiguous 
legal standards that the dissents, rather than the majorities, thought were appro-
priate. On a deeper, more meaningful level, the inversion can be accomplished by 
looking behind the doctrinal rules and focusing on factors that may better 
advance the instrumental goals that the concept of justiciability is intended to 
serve. This can have the effect of exposing the degree to which mere normative 
preferences of the Justices have been presented by the Court as if they were actual 
constitutional mandates.56 And such exposure suggests that the Supreme Court 
possesses a degree of unconstrained judicial discretion in race-relations matters 
that ought to be viewed as troubling. 
54. Id. at 742, 745. 
55. See id. at 742–47. The Court applied a similar standing test to partisan gerrymandering claims in 
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930–31 (2018). 
56. I discussed techniques for making normative preferences appear to be constitutional mandates in 
Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 709, 710–11, 721–47 (2005). 
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A. PARTISAN LEGAL RIGHTS 
The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Rucho holds that partisan gerryman-
dering claims are nonjusticiable political questions because there are no judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards on which the Court can rely to determine 
the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.57 However, on a doctrinal level, 
there are a number of legal standards that the Court could have used to determine 
the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering. On a deeper, instrumental level, 
more elaborate arguments favoring justiciability can be rooted in the constraining 
function of judicially manageable standards, the goal of democratic self-gover-
nance, and the nature of an injury that is sufficient to confer standing. 
1. Doctrinal Arguments 
The doctrinal need for “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” is 
traceable to Baker v. Carr.58 But Baker held that the failure to reapportion the 
Tennessee legislature for sixty years—and the vote dilution that the resulting leg-
islative malapportionment entailed—did present a justiciable claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 Accordingly, the doc-
trinal requirement of judicially discoverable and manageable standards is quite 
ambiguous. It was satisfied by the equal protection vote-dilution claims asserted 
in Baker, but it was not satisfied by the equal protection vote-dilution claims 
asserted in Rucho. Therefore, one way to invert the nonjusticiability holding of 
Rucho is simply to conclude that the Equal Protection Clause does provide a 
57. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494, 2501, 2508 (2019). The majority opinion of 
Chief Justice Roberts could be read to accord dominant political parties a constitutional right to draw 
district lines in a way that gives them a partisan advantage. The opinion says, “[T]he opportunity to 
control the drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical 
and traditional part of politics in the United States.” Id. at 2498 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). The opinion goes on 
to say that the question before the Court is how to “provid[e] a standard for deciding how much partisan 
dominance is too much.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (plurality opinion)). To the extent that this language can be 
viewed as “holding” that dominant political parties have a constitutional right to draw district lines that 
give them a partisan advantage, it is problematic. That is because the opinion also held that the issue 
before the Court was a nonjusticiable political question over which the Court lacks Article III 
jurisdiction to issue any holding. In that regard, any substantive Rucho holding would be reminiscent of 
the Court’s dramatic dictum holdings in cases like Marbury v. Madison and Dred Scott. See Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding Missouri Compromise Act of 1820 
unconstitutional, and holding blacks could not be citizens, despite holding that Court lacked 
jurisdiction); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (resolving multiple issues, including 
power of judicial review, despite holding that Court lacked jurisdiction); see also Girardeau A. Spann, 
Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 589–92, 609 (1983) (discussing lack of jurisdiction in 
Marbury and Dred Scott). A formalist way around this problem in Rucho might be to interpret that case 
as holding that the Court had jurisdiction to find the existence of a constitutional right to partisan 
advantage, but that the constitutionally permissible degree of that partisan advantage was a political 
question over which the Court lacked jurisdiction. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498–99 (focusing on 
difficulty in determining how much partisan dominance is too much). 
58. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
59. See id. at 192–95, 217, 228, 232, 238. 
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judicially discoverable and manageable standard, just as it had in Baker. And that 
is precisely what Justice Kagan did in her Rucho dissent. 
Justice Kagan asserted in Rucho that the Equal Protection Clause provided a 
judicially discoverable and manageable standard, because it “‘guarantees the op-
portunity for equal participation by all voters in the election’ of legislators.”60 
Justice Kagan also found a plethora of other standards on which the majority 
could have relied in adjudicating the partisan gerrymandering claims of the plain-
tiffs.61 She identified the First Amendment, which protects voters from “disfa-
vored treatment” in the form of counting their votes for less, because of “their 
voting history [and] their expression of political views.”62 She noted that, 
“[C]ourts across the country, including those below, have coalesced around man-
ageable judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims.”63 These 
included both lower federal courts64 and state courts.65 She also suggested that 
close questions could be avoided by limiting the operative standard to “extreme 
outlier” gerrymanders.66 
For Justice Kagan, judicial neutrality could be ensured by looking for devia-
tions from a state’s own political geography and districting criteria,67 or it could 
focus on the “‘predominant’ purpose and ‘substantial’ effects” standard that had 
been utilized by the lower courts.68 Justice Kagan emphasized that “predominant” 
purpose and “substantial” effects tests contained the types of legal standards that 
courts are accustomed to applying in a variety of contexts, where they seek to as-
certain legislative intent for the purpose of constitutional analysis.69 She stressed 
that the standards she had identified were similar to, and no less judicially man-
ageable than, the one-person-one-vote standard that courts are required to apply 
when ruling on the constitutionality of legislative reapportionment plans under 
Reynolds v. Sims.70 
Justice Kagan disclaimed any intent to use proportional representation as a 
standard for governing partisan gerrymandering.71 But it is unclear why propor-
tional representation would not be a perfectly appropriate standard. In fact, the 
Supreme Court itself has authorized state officials to pursue proportional repre-
sentation between political parties when they wish to do so.72 In a properly 
60. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2514 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 
(1964)). 
61. See id. at 2509, 2514. 
62. Id. at 2514 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
63. Id. at 2509. 
64. See id. at 2516–17. 
65. See id. at 2524. 
66. See id. at 2517–19. 
67. See id. at 2520–21. 
68. Id. at 2522. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. at 2514. 
71. See id. at 2515–16, 2520–21, 2523. 
72. See id. at 2517 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)). 
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functioning political process, where one person’s vote was genuinely equal to the 
vote of another, we would expect the political makeup of the legislature to reflect 
the political makeup of the electorate. And unexplained deviations from the pro-
portionality baseline would enable a court to determine when a partisan gerry-
mander had gone too far. 
There are a variety of mathematical ways in which a court could decide how 
much deviation from an aspirational norm was too much. One of the most prom-
ising was relied on by a three-judge court in Gill v. Whitford when it invalidated a 
partisan Republican gerrymander in Wisconsin.73 In Gill, the plaintiffs demon-
strated that Republicans had secured excessive political representation in the state 
legislature by “cracking” Democratic voters into multiple voting districts where 
their numbers were too small to win, and by “packing” Democratic voters into 
other districts where their numbers were much higher than what was necessary to 
win, thereby removing those Democratic voters from other districts in which they 
might have been able to prevail.74 The plaintiffs provided a mathematical formula 
for calculating an “efficiency gap” that compared the “wasted” votes of each 
party in a way that showed an unusually large efficiency gap favoring 
Republicans.75 They also contrasted the Wisconsin Republican gerrymander with 
a “Demonstration Plan” that could have satisfied the legal criteria for apportion-
ment, and was “almost perfectly balanced in its partisan consequences.”76 
The three-judge district court in Gill found the Republican partisan gerryman-
der to be unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.77 
However, the Court did not remand because of any defect in the “efficiency gap” 
concept of proportionality. Rather, the Court remanded because it doubted the 
standing of the plaintiffs to raise a statewide vote-dilution claim. The majority 
opinion of Chief Justice Roberts said: 
The plaintiffs and their amici curiae promise us that the efficiency gap and 
similar measures of partisan asymmetry will allow the federal courts—armed 
with just “a pencil and paper or a hand calculator”—to finally solve the prob-
lem of partisan gerrymandering that has confounded the Court for decades. 
We need not doubt the plaintiffs’ math. The difficulty for standing purposes is 
that these calculations are an average measure. They do not address the effect 
that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens. Partisan-asymmetry 
metrics such as the efficiency gap measure something else entirely: the effect 
that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political parties.78 
73. See 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1925 (2018). 
74. See id. at 1920. 
75. See id. at 1933. 
76. Id. at 1924 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Complaint ¶ 10, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016)). 
77. See id. at 1934. 
78. Id. at 1933 (citations omitted). 
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As discussed below, there is a problem with the Court’s standing analysis.79 
But not even the Supreme Court found any deficiency in the mathematical mea-
sure of proportionality offered by the plaintiffs in Gill. 
Even if one were not willing to accept political proportionality as the proper 
standard, the Court could adopt a standard precluding partisan gerrymandering 
that was intended solely to secure a partisan advantage for one political party, if it 
lacked any other public purpose.80 The intent inquiry would, once again, be simi-
lar to the sorts of intent inquires that courts are routinely required to make.81 
Doctrinally, therefore, it would be relatively easy to rule that partisan gerryman-
dering claims were justiciable if the Supreme Court were inclined to do so. 
Indeed, four Justices on the Rucho Court were so inclined. But five were not. 
2. Instrumental Arguments 
Formal doctrinal analysis is often unsatisfying because legal doctrines can fail 
to capture the issues that seem to matter the most. In Rucho, Chief Justice 
Roberts focused on the differences between partisan and racial gerrymandering 
because he thought those differences were doctrinally significant. But by empha-
sizing instead the instrumental concerns that actually seem to be at stake, one’s 
views about the proper outcome can change. 
As an instrumental matter, justiciability doctrines are designed to serve two ba-
sic functions. First, they help ensure that courts are presented with legal issues in 
a context that is suitable for judicial resolution under the traditional Marbury 
model of adjudication, where courts have the obligation to protect legal rights, 
even if doing so entails invalidating the acts of other branches of government.82 
Second, justiciability doctrines advance separation-of-powers concerns by help-
ing to ensure that courts do not usurp the power to resolve issues for which other 
branches of government have greater relative institutional competence.83 It turns 
out that those instrumental goals are advanced by deeming partisan gerrymanders 
to be justiciable at least as much as they are advanced by deeming racial gerry-
manders to be justiciable. 
If one focuses on the similarities rather than the differences that exist between 
partisan and racial gerrymandering, three factors argue in favor of judicial protec-
tion against the injuries that are inflicted by partisan gerrymandering. First, the 
governing legal standards are adequate to confine the reviewing court to its proper 
judicial role. Second, judicial protection facilitates the process of democratic 
self-governance in a way that cannot be ensured by relying on mere political pro-
tections. Third, the court is guarding against the type of legal injury that is 
79. See infra Part II.A.2.c. 
80. Such a standard is proposed in Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm 
Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 352–59 (2017). 
81. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
82. See Spann, supra note 57, at 588–92, 617–32 (discussing the traditional dispute-resolution model 
of judicial review traceable to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 166, 167, 170–71 
(1803), and the influence of that model on justiciability doctrines). 
83. See id. 
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customarily sufficient to confer standing. So viewed, the justiciability of the 
Court’s obligation to protect partisan legal rights becomes controlling rather than 
inapposite. 
a. Judicially Manageable Standards. 
In Easley v. Cromartie, the Supreme Court held that what appears to be an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander could actually be a constitutionally permissi-
ble partisan gerrymander.84 That is because there is often a high correlation 
between race and political affiliation.85 Because one could be used as a proxy for 
the other in a way that would be hard to detect from the outside, the degree of ju-
dicial scrutiny needed to uncover unconstitutional voter discrimination would be 
the same regardless of how the gerrymander was initially labeled. The two inqui-
ries would be equally justiciable. So viewed, the judicial adjudication of a parti-
san gerrymandering claim—like the adjudication of a racial gerrymandering 
claim—looks like the adjudication of a legal right under the Marbury model 
rather than a nonjusticiable political question. 
From this perspective, judicially discoverable and manageable standards begin 
to emerge that can facilitate the judicial, rather than mere political, protection of 
vote-dilution claims that the concept of justiciability allocates to courts. The 
“predominant factor” test that Miller v. Johnson uses to assess whether a major-
ity-minority voting district is a racial classification now becomes directly applica-
ble.86 It is as judicially manageable in the partisan gerrymandering context as 
intent standards have been in other areas of the law, such as enforcement of 
the First Amendment’s religion clauses.87 In addition, the Washington v. Davis 
intentional-discrimination standard for identifying a racial classification is appro-
priate to determine whether the use of political affiliation is being invoked as a 
proxy for facially neutral discrimination that is actually based on race.88 Such a 
surreptitious motive may well be operative in a districting context where voters 
do not wish to be placed in a voting district occupied primarily by members of 
another race. Regardless of how courts ultimately resolve such claims on the mer-
its, courts will minimize justiciability concerns because they are merely doing 
what they do every day in adjudicating racial discrimination claims and in pro-
tecting legal rights. 
The correlation between race and political affiliation is particularly strong in 
the electoral context, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
84. See 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001). Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rejected the claim made in 
Justice Thomas’s dissent that the majority was allowing “districting decisions based on a ‘stereotype’ 
about African–American voting behavior.” Id. at 257. 
85. See id. at 257–58. 
86. See 515 U.S. 900, 920–27 (1995). 
87. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2522 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing the 
Free Exercise Clause case of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)). 
88. See 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) (adopting an intentional-discrimination standard to define racial 
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause); see also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2522 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 239). 
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Trump Administration’s desire to include a citizenship question on the 2020 cen-
sus form in Department of Commerce v. New York.89 There, the Court concluded 
that the government’s offered justification for including the question was “con-
trived.”90 Press coverage indicated that, although the stated reason for adding the 
question was to facilitate enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the real reason 
was to facilitate the drawing of election districts that would enhance the voting 
strength of white Republicans by reducing the voting strength of Latinx residents 
who were likely to support Democratic candidates.91 
See Tara Bahrampour, GOP Strategist and Census Official Discussed Citizenship Question, New 
Documents Filed by Lawyers Suggest, WASH. POST (June 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
dc-md-va/2019/06/15/new-documents-suggest-direct-connection-between-republican-redistricting- 
strategist-census-bureau-official-over-citizenship-question/?utm_term=.fb19ad03c406.
In his Vieth v. Jubelirer plurality opinion, Justice Scalia argued that a 
Pennsylvania partisan gerrymandering challenge was nonjusticiable.92 In so 
doing, he asserted that segregating voters in districts by race was more unlawful, 
and less common, than segregating them by political affiliation.93 However, once 
the correlation between race and political partisanship is understood, as it was in 
Easley v. Cromartie, Justice Scalia’s assertions simply seem wrong. Justice 
Scalia claimed that racial discrimination is unlawful, but under Shaw, most racial 
discrimination in drawing district lines is, in fact, permissible—a point that 
Justice O’Connor hastened to stress in her Miller v. Johnson concurrence.94 
Moreover, discrimination based on political affiliation is itself often unconstitu-
tional.95 Accordingly, there is no inherent difference between racial discrimina-
tion and political-affiliation discrimination that would justify differential 
justiciability treatment of racial and partisan gerrymandering claims. And the 
suggestion that partisan gerrymandering occurs more frequently than racial dis-
crimination is simply nonresponsive to the realization that one can often appear 
to be the other. In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts assumes that there is a meaningful 
difference between legal rights that are protected by courts and political questions 
that are protected by the representative branches. But if that baseline assumption 
is wrong, then the conclusions that flow from it may also be wrong.   
89. See 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019). 
90. Id. at 2575. 
91. 
 
92. See 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
93. See id. at 285–86. This position ultimately was adopted by Chief Justice Roberts in Rucho. See 
139 S. Ct. at 2497 (“[W]hile it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-person, one-vote rule, or 
to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political 
gerrymandering.’” (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999))). 
94. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928–29 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
95. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 71–79 (1990) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not permit government employers to discriminate against non-policymaking 
employees on basis of political affiliation or belief); cf. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 
1416 (2016) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits dismissal or demotion of a government 
employee even based on the mistaken belief that the employee was engaged in partisan political 
activity). 
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b. Representative Democracy. 
Proper regulation of partisan gerrymandering should be viewed as justiciable 
because it is ultimately linked to the goal of promoting representative democracy. 
Citing Justice Stone’s famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer empha-
sized that, “Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most seri-
ous claims, for we have long believed that ‘the right to vote’ is one of ‘those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.’”96 To the 
extent that partisan gerrymandering threatens to undermine the proper function-
ing of representative democracy, it becomes increasingly important for partisan 
gerrymandering claims to be treated as justiciable, rather than as nonjusticiable 
political questions. Even if the Court viewed a governing standard as less than 
completely precise, an imperfect standard would still provide more of an incen-
tive for legislatures to avoid extreme partisan gerrymanders than the Rucho non-
justiciability ruling, which permits limitless partisan gerrymandering. 
As a matter of relative institutional competence, it makes sense to have an in-
terest protected by the branch of government that is best suited to provide protec-
tion. If it turns out that the interests jeopardized by partisan gerrymandering are 
better protected by courts than by redistricting legislatures, it is irrelevant that 
those interests seem more political than legal in nature. In the gerrymandering 
context, it is unlikely that politically dominant legislatures will wish to remedy 
the plight of voters whose electoral interests are harmed by their inclusion in par-
tisan gerrymandered districts. The interest of legislatures in maintaining their po-
litical dominance will make them insensitive to the interests of voters who would 
like to remove them from office. As a matter of relative institutional competence, 
therefore, courts are much more likely than legislatures to provide effective pro-
tection for the interests of voters who are in the political minority. This is a 
point that Justice Kagan makes in her Rucho dissent.97 It is also a point that under-
mines the baseline assumption that law and politics can be kept in the separate 
spheres to which Chief Justice Roberts would like to consign them.98 
Treating the interests harmed by partisan gerrymandering as political rather 
than justiciable simply ignores Justice Kennedy’s observation that such gerry-
mandering undermines the functioning of representative democracy.99 If partisan 
96. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–12 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
97. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2524 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
98. If maintaining those separate spheres were viable, the common 5–4, conservative–liberal splits of 
the Justices in politically controversial cases would make it unclear which sphere the Supreme Court 
itself was occupying. As if to illustrate the role of political expediency in Supreme Court adjudication, 
Chief Justice Roberts explicitly endorsed state districting commissions as a political solution to the 
partisan gerrymandering problem presented in Rucho. See id. at 2507–08 (majority opinion); id. at 2524 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). He did so even though Roberts himself had previously voted that such 
commissions were unconstitutional. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677–79 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
99. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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gerrymandering produces discriminatory vote dilution, it both violates the indi-
vidual rights of the voters who suffer the dilution, and threatens structural damage 
to our system of representative democracy. As partisan gerrymandering techni-
ques become more sophisticated and effective, the risks to individual rights and 
to the electoral system itself become more severe.100 One of the core responsibil-
ities of the Supreme Court should be to safeguard the structural features of our 
representative democracy because so much is at stake. As a result, the structural 
threats to democratic self-governance posed by partisan gerrymandering would 
seem to have an even stronger claim to judicial redress than the racial rights to 
which Chief Justice Roberts wishes to confine his conception of justiciability. 
Although none of the Justices in Rucho mention the case, Bush v. Gore appears 
relevant.101 There, the Supreme Court ordered the halt of a Florida election 
recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court in a case that ultimately facilitated 
the selection of George W. Bush over Al Gore as President of the United States 
in the 2000 election.102 The United States Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision held that 
the recount would violate the Equal Protection Clause because Florida’s govern-
ing “intent of the voter” standard did not ensure uniform treatment in counting 
the notorious “hanging” and “dimpled” chads on some ballots that had been 
cast.103 
The reason Bush v. Gore seems instructive is that the Court found a justiciable 
claim under the Equal Protection Clause even though no uniform rule could have 
provided equal treatment of the Florida ballots that were cast. And, as Justice 
Souter pointed out in his dissent, the Court did so even though a political solution 
to the recount issue seemed both possible and preferable.104 The political alterna-
tive to Supreme Court intervention was also forcefully asserted in Justice 
Breyer’s dissent.105 It is difficult to think of something more directly tied to repre-
sentative democracy than the election of the President of the United States. 
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court thought that the equal protection issue pre-
sented in Bush v. Gore was justiciable—despite its extremely political nature— 
then partisan gerrymandering claims seem to be at least as justiciable. 
As Justice Stevens emphasized in his Bush v. Gore dissent, there were a variety 
of ways in which local election officials applied the “intent of the voter” standard, 
subject to a single impartial magistrate who oversaw all objections to the recount 
process.106 But no rule interpreting the intent of the voter standard could have pro-
vided a uniform result. If all hanging or dimpled chads had been counted, that 
rule would have overcounted the votes of those who did not intend to cast a vote 
with their ambiguous ballots. If the hanging and dimpled chads had not been 
100. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
101. See 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
102. See id. at 111. 
103. See id. at 105–11. 
104. See id. at 129–30 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
105. See id. at 152–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative history shows that the Court 
should practice judicial restraint when faced with political disputes). 
106. See id. at 125–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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counted, the rule would have undercounted the votes of those who did intend to 
cast a vote with their ambiguous ballots. Even more fundamentally, by stopping 
the Florida recount, the United States Supreme Court merely reinstated the initial 
vote count. And it did so despite the fact that the initial vote count had been 
tainted by the same lack of uniformity that tainted the recount that the Court 
enjoined. 
The one thing we know about the Supreme Court’s application of the Equal 
Protection Clause in Bush v. Gore is that it ensured unequal outcomes. But never-
theless, the Court found that standard to be judicially discoverable and managea-
ble enough to permit the Court to influence the outcome of a presidential 
election. If the equal protection and intent standards can serve as adequate bases 
for adjudicating the “political question” of who should be elected President of the 
United States, surely they can serve as adequate bases for justiciability in ordi-
nary partisan gerrymandering cases—especially where the proper functioning of 
democratic self-governance is at stake. 
c. Standing. 
Even if judicially manageable standards and democratic self-governance con-
cerns indicated that partisan gerrymandering raised claims of legal right rather 
than political questions, there would still be a justiciability issue relating to stand-
ing. United States v. Hays held that only residents of a racially gerrymandered 
district had standing to challenge the constitutionality of that district.107 
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Gill v. Whitford that only residents of a par-
tisan gerrymandered district had standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
that district.108 
The standing requirement was problematic in the racial gerrymandering con-
text, but it is particularly troubling in the partisan gerrymandering context. The 
residency requirement might make a minimal amount of sense in the racial con-
text as something that was relevant to the representational injury suffered by a 
Shaw plaintiff.109 However, in a partisan gerrymandering case, the primary injury 
being inflicted is not representational in nature. Rather, the injury results from the 
vote dilution caused by malapportionment of the entire legislature. That malap-
portionment is the reason why the vote of someone in the minority party has less 
political influence than the vote of someone in the controlling party. Even if the 
two political parties have an equal number of voters, the partisan gerrymander 
allows the controlling party to elect more representatives than the minority party 
is able to elect. It is as if members of the controlling party are given two votes, 
whereas members of the minority party are given only one. 110 
107. See 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995). 
108. See 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930–31 (2018). 
109. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
110. Justice Kagan made both a vote-dilution and a First Amendment right-of-association version of 
this argument in her Gill concurrence, arguing that the statewide effects of partisan gerrymandering 
were properly cognizable. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934–40 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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Nevertheless, the Gill Court’s holding is unambiguous: standing law does not 
recognize loss of electoral power as a cognizable injury under Article III, because 
Article III recognizes only individual, and not statewide, injuries.111 In Gill, Chief 
Justice Roberts said: 
To the extent the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that 
injury is district specific. 
. . . 
The plaintiffs argue that their claim of statewide injury is analogous to the 
claims presented in Baker and Reynolds, which they assert were “statewide in 
nature” because they rested on allegations that “districts throughout a state 
[had] been malapportioned.” But, as we have already noted, the holdings in 
Baker and Reynolds were expressly premised on the understanding that the inju-
ries giving rise to those claims were “individual and personal in nature” . . . .112 
Characterizing the vote-dilution injury suffered by the victims of partisan ger-
rymandering as personal rather than statewide simply ignores the true nature of 
the injury that has been inflicted. The partisan gerrymandering of one voting dis-
trict, of course, affects the partisan makeup of other voting districts as well. 
Indeed, that is the whole point of partisan gerrymandering. By distributing 
opposition-party voters among particular districts, the controlling party can 
ensure that it will win races in a disproportionately larger number of election dis-
tricts than its political support warrants. The harm inflicted is the transfer of polit-
ical power from a party that can legitimately claim it to a party that cannot. 
Arguing that the loss of statewide political power must be disregarded is like 
arguing that the injury inflicted by school segregation could be solved simply by 
sending Linda Brown to a white school. Segregation inflicts a systemwide injury, 
and the remedy for that injury must be systemwide as well. The same is true of 
the systemwide injury inflicted by partisan gerrymandering. The vote-dilution 
injuries inflicted by partisan gerrymandering should be deemed justiciable 
because of the collective impact that they have on democratic majority rule. 
Nevertheless, if forced to state the harm caused by partisan gerrymandering as 
an injury that is “individual and personal”113 for purposes of the law of standing, 
the individual victim of a partisan gerrymander suffers a loss of political power 
that is commensurate with the political power to which that voter is entitled by 
virtue of having associated with other voters sharing the same political interests. 
The diluted vote is the vote that would have entitled the voter to additional politi-
cal power. When the partisan gerrymander is sufficiently successful, that means 
that the injured voter will have lost the right to be in the political majority and 
will instead be consigned to the minority at the close of the election. Chief Justice 
111. See id. at 1930–31 (majority opinion). 
112. Id. at 1930 (citations omitted). 
113. Id. at 1929 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964)). 
1000 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 108:981 
Roberts certainly understands the true nature of this injury. But he chooses simply 
to ignore it in order to make partisan gerrymandering appear nonjusticiable. 
The presence of judicially manageable standards, the need to protect demo-
cratic self-governance, and the need to guard against the types of injuries that are 
inflicted by partisan gerrymandering all suggest that partisan gerrymandering 
claims should be viewed as justiciable. In discussing partisan gerrymandering in 
Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts admits, “Excessive partisanship in districting leads 
to results that reasonably seem unjust.”114 He also admits that “such gerrymander-
ing is ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’”115 But by refusing to concede 
the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering, Roberts paradoxically concludes 
that the judicial intervention needed to restore “the very foundation of democratic 
decisionmaking” is prohibited, precisely because it would destroy that very foun-
dation.116 In a representative democracy, protecting democratic self-governance 
should be the highest calling for judicial review.117 Justice Kagan captures the 
point rhetorically. After describing the extreme partisan gerrymandering pre-
sented to the Court in Rucho, she asks, “Is that how American democracy is sup-
posed to work? I have yet to meet the person who thinks so.”118 
B. RACIAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
The opinions of the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno119 and Miller v. Johnson120 
hold that, unlike partisan gerrymandering, racial gerrymandering does raise justi-
ciable issues. A voter subjected to a racial gerrymander suffers a legal injury that 
federal courts have jurisdiction to redress through enforcement of the Equal 
Protection Clause.121 But the meaning of the equal protection standard in the con-
text of redistricting is ambiguous, and the Justices in the majorities of Shaw and 
Miller proffered a different interpretation than the Justices in the dissents. Once 
again, there are doctrinal reasons to view racial gerrymandering as nonjusticiable. 
In addition, there are instrumental reasons for finding racial gerrymandering to be 
nonjusticiable that relate to the existence of judicially manageable standards, the 
elusive distinction between racial and political rights, and the relative institu-
tional competence of courts as opposed to the political branches. 
114. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019). 
115. Id. (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015)). 
116. Id. at 2500 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004)). 
117. I realize that there is an irony in asking a countermajoritarian judiciary to override the policy 
preferences of the democratically accountable branches of government in the name of democratic self- 
governance. The countermajoritarian argument against judicial review is an argument with which I have 
some sympathy, especially in areas where imprecise doctrinal standards impose only loose constraints 
on the exercise of judicial discretion. However, for those who favor judicial review despite the 
countermajoritarian dangers that it creates, the judicial enforcement of structural safeguards that are 
designed to promote democratic self-governance would seem to have a relatively strong claim to 
judicial legitimacy. 
118. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
119. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
120. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
121. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916–17, 920; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642–44, 649–50. 
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1. Doctrinal Arguments 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Shaw viewed application of the equal 
protection standard as straightforward. Unless strict scrutiny could be satisfied, 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited efforts to “‘segregat[e] . . . voters’ on the 
basis of race.”122 A voter assigned to a voting district on the basis of race was the 
victim of racial discrimination in the same way that a student assigned to a school 
on the basis of race was the victim of racial discrimination.123 Such voter segrega-
tion bore “an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid” because “[i]t 
reinforce[d] the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of 
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live— 
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls.”124 
Dissenting, Justice Souter had a different interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. He said: 
The majority’s use of “segregation” to describe the effect of districting here 
may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it 
subject to like scrutiny. But a principal consequence of school segregation was 
inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any 
other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality 
of political participation.125 
For a variety of reasons, the view of the dissenters—that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not create a new cause of action for disappointed white voters to 
challenge the constitutionality of majority-minority voting districts—supports 
the conclusion that racial gerrymandering claims should not be viewed as justici-
able in the context of redistricting. 
None of the opinions in Shaw mention justiciability or the political question 
doctrine. However, the Court’s decision two years later in Miller made justici-
ability a central issue in redistricting cases. In Miller, the majority and dissenting 
Justices disagreed over the issue of standing—specifically, the constitutional 
component of standing requires a plaintiff to suffer an injury in fact that would be 
redressed by a favorable ruling on the merits of the plaintiff’s legal claim.126 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Miller assumed that five white voters 
aggrieved by being assigned to a majority-minority voting district suffered an 
injury sufficient for standing. Because they resided in the challenged district, as 
required for standing under United States v. Hays, they suffered the type of  
122. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (alteration in original) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 
341 (1960)). 
123. See id. at 641–49. 
124. Id. at 647. 
125. Id. at 682 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)). 
126. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1975). 
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representational harms recognized in Shaw.127 Their injury, therefore, stemmed 
from the danger that a minority representative elected in their majority-minority 
district might not adequately represent their interests.128 
Justice Stevens disagreed. In dissent, he argued that the white plaintiffs had not 
suffered any “legally cognizable injury” sufficient for standing.129 In so doing, he 
also highlighted a fundamental incoherence in the new Shaw cause of action, 
which both condemned and reinforced racial stereotypes. He said: 
The Shaw Court explained the concept of “representational harms” as follows: 
“When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived com-
mon interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe 
that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, 
rather than their constituency as a whole.” Although the Shaw Court attributed 
representational harms solely to a message sent by the legislature’s action, 
those harms can only come about if the message is received—that is, first, if 
all or most black voters support the same candidate, and, second, if the suc-
cessful candidate ignores the interests of her white constituents. Appellees’ 
standing, in other words, ultimately depends on the very premise the Court 
purports to abhor: that voters of a particular race “think alike, share the same 
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.” This gener-
alization, as the Court recognizes, is “offensive and demeaning.”130 
Because, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the new Shaw cause of action ends up 
being self-consuming, the injury required for jurisdictional standing is nonexis-
tent.131 Accordingly, it makes sense to resist the Shaw and Miller holdings and 
conclude that Shaw claims asserted under the Equal Protection Clause are better 
viewed as nonjusticiable. 
In her Miller dissent, Justice Ginsburg offers yet another reason for reaching 
this conclusion. Whatever may constitute legally cognizable racial discrimination 
in other contexts, no legally cognizable injury can exist in the redistricting con-
text. Unlike school segregation, which can violate someone’s right to be 
treated as an individual rather than as a mere member of a group, there is no com-
parable right to individualized treatment in the redistricting context. Ginsburg 
emphasizes: 
In adopting districting plans, however, States do not treat people as individu-
als. Apportionment schemes, by their very nature, assemble people in groups. 
States do not assign voters to districts based on merit or achievement, stand-
ards States might use in hiring employees or engaging contractors. Rather, 
127. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995) (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 
744–45 (1995)). 
128. See id. Prior to Rucho, the Supreme Court adopted a similar standing requirement for partisan 
gerrymandering claims in Gill v. Whitford. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
129. Miller, 515 U.S. at 929 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
130. Id. at 930 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131. Id. at 930–31. 
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legislators classify voters in groups—by economic, geographical, political, or 
social characteristics—and then “reconcile the competing claims of [these] 
groups.”132 
The victims of racial gerrymandering may be disappointed or even offended 
by their inclusion in a voting district populated primarily by voters of a different 
race. But they do not incur any injury that is independent from the racial stereo-
types that the Court insists are impermissible. As a result, the victims of racial 
gerrymandering do not suffer the sorts of particularized injury to a legally pro-
tected interest that are typically required for standing. Doctrinally, therefore, 
racial gerrymandering claims should be treated as nonjusticiable. 
2. Instrumental Arguments 
In addition to the doctrinal rules relating to standing that point to rejecting the 
justiciability of Shaw redistricting challenges, there are, once again, deeper 
instrumental reasons for rejecting the Court’s characterization of racial gerryman-
dering as justiciable. Racial gerrymanders seem to share the characteristics of 
nonjusticiable political questions for three reasons. First, they do not rest on any 
claim of a legal right that the Supreme Court has not already rejected. Second, in 
the redistricting context, racial gerrymandering claims lack any judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards. Third, proper resolution of racial gerrymander-
ing claims is more likely when those claims are assigned to the political branches 
rather than to the courts. As a result, racial gerrymandering claims rest on ques-
tions that are ultimately political rather than judicial in nature. 
a. No Legal Right. 
Under the Marbury model of adjudication, the law of justiciability seeks to 
confine courts to the judicial function of adjudicating legal rights so that they will 
not intrude on the function of social policymaking that the Constitution allocates 
to the political branches. In its Shaw holding that racial gerrymandering claims 
are justiciable, the Supreme Court was guilty of such an intrusion because the 
new legal right that it claimed to be adjudicating did not actually exist. Rather, 
the Court was recasting a legal claim that it had already rejected in a way that 
made it appear to be a new legal right. Because the new right had no legitimate 
content, the Court’s use of that supposed new right to circumvent its prior 
132. Id. at 947 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). It is interesting to note that Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor seem to have 
reversed the customary positions that liberals and conservatives take on the issue of group versus 
individual rights. Liberal Justice Ginsburg seems to reject the recognition of any white group rights that 
could be offended by the creation of majority-minority voting districts, even though she tends to favor 
recognition of minority group rights in the context of racial affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272–74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Conservative Justice 
O’Connor seems to have accepted the legitimacy of treating voters as groups in the redistricting context, 
even though she typically rejects the legitimacy of group treatment in the racial affirmative action 
context. See, e.g., id. at 224–25 (majority opinion). This shift in customary political positions illustrates 
the degree of doctrinal plasticity that exists in the governing legal doctrines. 
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rejection of the actual claim at issue enabled the Court to engage in nonjusticiable 
political policymaking rather than the justiciable protection of a genuine legal 
right. 
The furtive nature of the racial gerrymandering claim that the Court recognized 
in Shaw is illustrated by the dispute among the Justices about whether Shaw was 
actually creating a new equal protection cause of action, or was instead seeking to 
camouflage a vote-dilution claim that the Court had already rejected. As has been 
noted, the Shaw majority claimed to be creating a new equal protection cause of 
action that was available to voters who were segregated in voting districts due to 
their race.133 However, Justice White’s dissent in Shaw argued that the only con-
crete harm that could result from assigning white voters to majority-minority dis-
tricts was the harm that the political influence of white voters might be diluted.134 
And it turns out that the Court had already rejected that vote-dilution claim in a 
1977 case called United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey 
(UJO).135 The UJO Court rejected the claim because “members of the white ma-
jority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had 
been unfairly canceled,” and ultimately the Shaw Court chose “not to overrule, 
but rather to sidestep, UJO.”136 
Although the Shaw majority argued that the mere race-based assignment of 
voters to voting districts constituted a legal injury distinct from any vote-dilution 
injury, the Shaw dissenters explained how the race-based assignment of voters to 
voting districts alone could not be viewed as a meaningful injury in the redistrict-
ing context. The mere race-based treatment of individuals might be viewed as a 
legal injury in other contexts, such as the context of school segregation.137 That 
was because some benefits or harms were likely to result from the race-based 
assignment.138 However, the collateral harms that existed in an educational con-
text were simply not present in a redistricting context where all voters retained 
the same right to vote regardless of the voting districts to which they were 
assigned.139 Where assignment to voting districts was involved, no injury existed 
independent of the potential vote-dilution injury that the UJO Court had found 
could not plausibly be said to have been inflicted on white voters in light of the 
majority voting power that they retained. 
The argument of the Shaw dissenters seems persuasive. But whether the Shaw 
racial gerrymandering claim is ultimately deemed the same as, or different from, 
the UJO vote-dilution claim, it does seem to parallel the partisan gerrymandering 
claim that Rucho declared to be a political question. In both cases, the plaintiffs 
suffered the same vote-dilution harms. And if discriminatory assignment 
133. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
134. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658–59 (1993) (White, J., dissenting). 
135. See 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
136. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658–59 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 667–70. 
137. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
138. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 681–82 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
139. See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text. 
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simpliciter is to be recognized as a legal injury, that injury is equally present in 
both cases. It was present as racial discrimination in Shaw, and as political dis-
crimination in Rucho. If the Supreme Court thought that those injuries were insuf-
ficient to create a justiciable legal right in Rucho, those same injuries should also 
be insufficient to create a justiciable legal right in Shaw. If partisan gerrymander-
ing was a nonjusticiable political question in Rucho, it was a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question in Shaw as well. By purporting to adjudicate a legal claim that did 
not really exist in Shaw, the Supreme Court was violating separation-of-powers 
principles by substituting its policy preferences for the policy preferences of the 
political branches that sought to enhance electoral protections for minority 
voters. 
b. Judicially Manageable Standards. 
The standards that govern both the recognition and the adjudication of racial 
gerrymandering claims are too imprecise to be characterized as judicially man-
ageable. Even if Shaw is viewed as implicating legal rights rather than political 
questions, the Easley v. Cromartie problem still exists. A court viewing the racial 
gerrymander as justiciable would still have to decide in a particular case whether 
it was looking at a racial gerrymander or an instance in which purported partisan 
politics was being used to camouflage the predominant use of race. Indeed, that 
very dispute occurred in the Shaw litigation itself. Easley v. Cromartie resolved 
the characterization problem by deeming the North Carolina voting district at 
issue to be a partisan gerrymander rather than a racial one. But in so doing, the 
Supreme Court had to declare the three-judge district court’s contrary finding to 
be clearly erroneous.140 Indeed, the characterization problem was so judicially 
unmanageable that Easley was the fourth time the North Carolina voting district 
at issue in the initial Shaw case had been before the Supreme Court.141 And then, 
proper characterization of the same district after a subsequent redistricting plan 
appeared before the Court for yet a fifth time in Cooper v. Harris in 2017.142 
The judicially unmanageable distinction between partisan and racial gerryman-
ders in our current racially polarized culture is so slippery that Joey Fishkin has 
referred to it as a “sinkhole.”143 
Joseph Fishkin, Rucho: A Sinkhole Dangerously Close to the House, BALKINIZATION (July 1, 
2019, 11:22 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/07/rucho-sinkhole-dangerously-close-to.html 
[https://perma.cc/L56A-8875].
He fears that the two concepts are so closely 
related that an effort to treat one in a particular manner may end up swallowing 
the other—the way a sinkhole indiscriminately swallows everything in its vicin-
ity.144 This, of course, creates opportunities for strategic behavior in the way that 
each concept can be classified.145 The possibility of such strategic behavior— 
140. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001). 
141. See id. at 237. 
142. See 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017). 
143. 
 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
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especially if it is politically motivated, as seems likely to have been the case in 
Rucho—increases the danger that a court will violate the separation-of-powers 
underpinnings of the justiciability doctrines. If a court strays from the judicially 
legitimate goal of protecting legal rights and intrudes into the sphere of political 
policymaking, the court will be usurping a function that the Constitution assigns 
to the political branches of government. 
Another thing that makes the Shaw racial gerrymander standard problematic is 
that it permits some, but not all, consideration of race in the districting process.146 
If racial gerrymanders are unconstitutional, why are they not always unconstitu-
tional? And the Miller Court’s effort to contain the problem by using a predomi-
nant-factor test simply highlights the imprecision inherent in that standard.147 
Once again, that was the elusive standard the Supreme Court was using in the 
Easley litigation as the case repeatedly reappeared before the Court. 
Miller also holds that districting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if 
the resulting districts group together voters who constitute “communities defined 
by actual shared interests.”148 But given the prevalence of racial bloc voting—the 
bloc voting that permits Easley to recharacterize race as political affiliation—it is 
not clear why race does not constitute a community of shared interests for district-
ing purposes. This is a point that Justice Ginsburg makes forcefully in her Miller 
dissent. Ethnic groups that are “Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Polish, [and] 
Russian” count as communities of shared interests, but apparently racial minor-
ities do not.149 If the governing standard encompasses some communities defined 
by actual shared interests but not others, it is difficult to see how the standard can 
be judicially managed to generate consistent, coherent, and defensible results. 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Shaw, discusses another feature that makes the 
racial gerrymandering standards unmanageable. The Shaw cause of action per-
mits white voters to invalidate majority-minority voting districts that are designed 
to benefit underrepresented minority groups. This allows a group with more polit-
ical power to neutralize remedial districting efforts intended to equalize political 
power. Justice Stevens concludes that such a result “could only be described as 
perverse.”150 Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor rejected any special rule for the be-
nign, remedial use of race.151 A standard that can be applied in a way that both 
advances and negates the racial-equality objectives that the standard is intended 
to serve may be judicially manipulable, but it is not judicially manageable under 
any defensible definition of the term. 
146. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). 
147. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916–17 (1995) (adopting the “predominant factor” test). 
Indeed, in Rucho, the Court held that the predominant-factor test was too imprecise to constitute a 
judicially manageable standard in the context of partisan gerrymandering. See Rucho v. Common 
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502–03 (2019). 
148. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. 
149. Id. at 944–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
150. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 677–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151. See id. at 653–58 (majority opinion). 
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One additional feature makes the Shaw racial gerrymandering standard seem 
unmanageable. Under the Miller predominant-factor test, it is permissible to 
engage in racial gerrymandering unless race becomes the predominant factor in 
drawing district lines. The meaning of the predominant-factor test is, of course, 
imprecise. But there is one thing that it could well mean. It could mean that con-
sideration of race is permissible as long as the consideration of race is not out-
come-determinative. Another way to phrase the test is that race can be considered 
in a districting context as long as the consideration of race does not matter. Once 
it does matter, however, the Court can simply say that the consideration of race 
has become predominant, and therefore, unconstitutional. Why would a court 
want to invoke such a standard as a basis for finding an issue to be justiciable 
unless it wanted to preserve for itself the discretion to pick and choose among the 
racial gerrymanders that it wished to invalidate or uphold? If the ability to con-
strain the exercise of judicial discretion is part of what makes a standard judicially 
manageable, the Miller predominant-factor standard does not survive that test. 
c. Relative Institutional Competence. 
On an even deeper instrumental level, it may make sense to view issues attend-
ant to racial gerrymanders as nonjusticiable in a redistricting context because the 
Court lacks the relative institutional competence to resolve them. The representa-
tive branches may be institutionally able to do a better job. The problem of racial 
discrimination in voting has a history that is long enough, and severe enough, that 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in order to address the prob-
lem.152 And the statute appeared to be working. In fact, its provisions enabled the 
election of the first black representatives in some southern states since 
Reconstruction.153 But then the Supreme Court created the Shaw cause of action, 
which had the effect of reversing the progress that had been made by invalidating 
the very types of majority-minority voting districts that had made electoral gains 
possible for racial minorities. 
It is far from clear why we should think that such a Supreme Court could do a 
better job than the political branches in protecting minority voting rights. The 
United States Attorney General had adopted a policy of maximizing the number 
of majority-minority voting districts that a jurisdiction’s political geography 
would permit before granting preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act. But the Supreme Court in Miller refused to consider that policy a compelling 
interest that could satisfy the strict scrutiny required by Shaw for the survival of 
majority-minority districts.154   
152. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
153. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Georgia); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 659 (White, 
J., dissenting) (North Carolina); id. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (North Carolina). 
154. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 909, 917–18, 921–26. 
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to remedy 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause.155 In addition, Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to remedy racial discrimination 
in voting.156 Congress authorized the Attorney General to enforce remedial anti-
discrimination policies in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.157 But the Supreme 
Court’s Shaw cause of action has undermined the remedial efforts of the political 
actors who have tried to promote voting rights. The Supreme Court seems to pro-
ceed from an analytical baseline that assumes that the current allocation of politi-
cal power among whites and racial minorities is a natural and neutral allocation 
that the Supreme Court is obliged to protect. Therefore, interpreting the laws of 
justiciability in a way that permits judicial intervention in the process of provid-
ing political protections for minority voting rights does not seem particularly pru-
dent. Stated more succinctly, a Shaw-based claim of racial gerrymandering 
should be deemed nonjusticiable because the usurpation of political functions 
entailed in the judicial recognition of such a claim would violate separation-of- 
powers principles. 
III. GERRYMANDERING JUSTICIABILITY 
The Court chose to treat racial gerrymandering as justiciable in Shaw and parti-
san gerrymandering as nonjusticiable in Rucho. And I fear there was a reason for 
that choice. It allows the Court to exercise the considerable discretion it accords 
itself under its justiciability jurisprudence to advance what it apparently believes 
is one of its social functions. In a time of increasing cultural diversity in the 
United States—a time when whites will soon cease to constitute a numerical ma-
jority of the population—the Court appears to have gerrymandered the law of jus-
ticiability in a way that facilitates the efforts of whites to preserve the current 
advantage they have over racial minorities in the domain of electoral politics.158 
See Sabrina Tavernise, Why the Announcement of a Looming White Minority Makes 
Demographers Nervous, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/us/white- 
americans-minority-population.html (explaining that the announcement that whites will no longer be a 
majority of the population by 2044 has made whites racially apprehensive). Fears of white persons of 
losing their majority status have prompted President Donald Trump and other Republicans to adopt a 
strategy of overt appeals to the racist and xenophobic segments of their white working-class core 
political base. See Matt Viser, Midterms Test Whether Republicans Not Named Trump Can Win by 
Stoking Racial Animosity, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2018, 7:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/midterms-test-whether-republicans-not-named-trump-can-win-by-stoking-racial-animosity/ 
2018/11/04/bb5f00ac-e059-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html?utm_term=.3a3dc348dfa9.
Moreover, that social function is consistent with the role that the Supreme Court 
has played in applying other doctrines throughout U.S. history in matters that 
affect the race relations of the country. 
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
156. See id. amend. XV, § 2. 
157. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
158. 
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A. DILUTING MINORITY VOTES 
As the 5–4 decisions in Rucho,159 Shaw,160 and Miller161 indicate, the Supreme 
Court’s justiciability jurisprudence gives the Court a considerable amount of dis-
cretion to decide how it wants to rule in gerrymandering cases. The outcome in 
each of those cases was determined by the views of a single swing-vote Justice. 
Doctrinally and conceptually, the Supreme Court could easily have ruled either 
way on the justiciability of partisan and racial gerrymandering. It could have 
upheld the justiciability of both, rejected the justiciability of both, or upheld the 
justiciability of one while rejecting the justiciability of the other. If the Court 
wishes to uphold a gerrymander, it can characterize the gerrymander as partisan, 
treat it as nonjusticiable under Rucho, and simply defer to the political process 
that adopted it. If the Court wishes to invalidate a gerrymander, it can character-
ize the gerrymander as racial, intervene to resolve a dispute that is justiciable 
under Shaw, and invalidate the gerrymander by finding race to be the “predomi-
nant factor” under Miller. The breadth of the Court’s discretion in choosing how 
to characterize the gerrymander is further increased by the Court’s ability under 
Easley v. Cromartie to treat race as partisanship when doing so will advance the 
Court’s objective. The Court has lots of discretion, and the absence of meaningful 
constraint allows the Court to exercise that discretion in ways that are likely to 
reflect the political and ideological leanings of the Court’s conservative and lib-
eral voting blocs. It also allows that discretion to be exercised in ways that reflect 
the political and ideological leanings of the Court on the issue of race.162 In fact, 
the substantial overlap that exists between partisan and racial gerrymandering has 
already prompted some legislators to repackage their suspect, racially motivated 
gerrymanders as permissible partisan gerrymanders.163 
See Amy Gardner et al., Redistricting Activists Brace for Wall of Inaction as Battle Moves to 
States, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/12/redistricting- 
activists-brace-wall-inaction-battle-moves-states/?arc404=true (describing North Carolina’s efforts to 
repackage racial gerrymanders as partisan gerrymanders). 
The role of race is apparent on the surface of racial gerrymanders. But race can 
also play a significant role behind the scenes in partisan gerrymanders that occur 
in jurisdictions with high levels of racial bloc voting. Indeed, the high correlation 
that often exists between race and political affiliation prompted the Supreme 
Court to rule the way it did in Easley. There, the Court upheld a partisan gerry-
mander, but in so doing, it may actually have allowed race to function as a surrep-
titious predominant factor.164 In addition, the Voting Rights Act itself requires 
159. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 (2019). 
160. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 632 (1993). 
161. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 902 (1995). 
162. I have previously discussed the Supreme Court’s similar conservative and liberal voting blocs 
on the issue of affirmative action in GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159–63 (2000). 
163. 
164. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001). It is true that Easley upheld, as a partisan 
gerrymander, the creation of majority-minority districts that advanced the interests of Democrats and 
racial minorities. See id. However, because Republicans control a disproportionately high number of 
statehouses and governorships, the net effect of partisan gerrymandering is likely to benefit Republicans 
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that race be taken into account in order to prevent unlawful vote dilution in juris-
dictions where racial bloc voting takes place.165 And racial bloc voting had been 
found pervasive in the North Carolina voting districts at issue in Shaw.166 
Racial bloc voting has become common in the current political environment of 
the United States. For example, Democratic President Barack Obama received 
93% of the black vote in 2012 and Republican President Donald Trump received 
8% of the black vote in 2016.167 
Alison Durkee, Here’s a Breakdown of How African-Americans Voted in the 2016 Election, 
MIC (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.mic.com/articles/159402/here-s-a-break-down-of-how-african-americans- 
voted-in-the-2016-election [https://perma.cc/7CAN-UT48].
Trump did, however, win 58% of the white vote 
in 2016.168 Donald Trump has also adopted a reelection strategy for his 2020 pres-
idential campaign that makes overt appeals to white identity politics in the hope 
that the racial biases of his core political base will help him secure reelection.169 
See Michael Scherer, White Identity Politics Drives Trump, and the Republican Party Under 
Him, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-identity- 
politics-drives-trump-and-the-republican-party-under-him/2019/07/16/a5ff5710-a733-11e9-a3a6- 
ab670962db05_story.html?utm_term=.b8405f57a42c.
The intimate connection between racial and partisan gerrymandering is further 
illustrated by the Trump Administration’s hidden efforts to enhance white 
Republican voting strength by reducing Latinx and Democratic voting through 
the addition of a citizenship question on the 2020 Census forms.170 The relation-
ship between race and political affiliation is also strong enough that both partisan 
and racial gerrymandering challenges are sometimes asserted against the same 
voting districts.171 
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409–10, 413–14, 427, 
442, 443 (2006) (asserting both partisan and racial gerrymandering claims with respect to black and 
Latinx voters in Texas). Compare Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313–15 (2018) (adjudicating Texas 
racial gerrymandering claim), with id. at 2354–55 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting district court 
found race was used for partisan purposes); compare Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465–66 (2017) 
(adjudicating racial gerrymandering claim for North Carolina Districts 1 and 12), with Rucho v. 
Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019) (adjudicating North Carolina partisan gerrymandering 
claim for statewide districting map). See also Michael Li et al., The State of Redistricting Litigation 
(January 17, 2020), BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 2, 2019) (describing pending partisan and racial 
redistricting cases), https://perma.cc/8B8A-XGU6.
Racial gerrymanders are overtly racial, but partisan gerryman-
ders can also be racial gerrymanders in disguise. Accordingly, it is not clear 
whether the Supreme Court’s finding of nonjusticiability in Rucho was intended 
to help Republicans or was intended to help white Republicans. 
Rule-of-law rhetoric notwithstanding, it is not surprising that a Supreme Court 
with a five-Justice conservative majority tends to rule in ways that advance con-
servative political interests over liberal interests. And because race and political 
affiliation tend to be highly correlated, it is not surprising that a conservative 
Court will also tend to rule in ways that favor the interests of whites over the 
and whites more than it benefits Democrats and racial minorities. See infra notes 177–80 and 
accompanying text. 
165. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 680 (Souter, J., dissenting). 






170. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
171. 
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interests of racial minorities. That appears to be what is happening with the 
Supreme Court’s current justiciability jurisprudence in the context of gerryman-
dering. The Court defers on nonjusticiability grounds when white interests are 
being advanced, and it intervenes in what it finds to be a justiciable case or con-
troversy to invalidate a gerrymander when racial-minority interests are advanced. 
In cases like Rucho, where the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering is 
at issue, the Court now finds the constitutional challenges to be nonjusticiable. 
Partisan gerrymandering is typically used by a dominant political party to main-
tain or increase its control over a legislature or legislative delegation. The party 
that is out of power has little ability to force a gerrymander that is favorable to 
itself, or to prevent the dominant party from perpetuating its political dominance 
over the gerrymandering process. Under the facts of Rucho, the dominant 
Republican Party in North Carolina used extreme partisan gerrymandering to 
secure a highly disproportionate advantage in the state’s congressional delegation 
to the U.S. House of Representatives. After noting the unfairness of the gerry-
mander, and the strain that it placed on the principle of democratic self- 
governance, the conservative voting bloc on the Supreme Court nevertheless 
refused to intervene. It found that constitutional challenges to the gerrymander 
raised nonjusticiable political questions.172 That allowed the North Carolina 
Republican Party to succeed in its efforts to secure ten of the state’s thirteen seats 
in the House, despite having won only 55% of the popular vote.173 And because 
racial bloc voting is so high in North Carolina, the partisan gerrymander the 
Supreme Court allowed—giving Republicans a dramatic advantage over 
Democrats—also gave whites a dramatic political advantage over racial minor-
ities in selecting North Carolina delegates to the House.174 
Not all partisan gerrymanders will favor Republicans (and therefore whites) 
even where racial bloc voting is prevalent. Partisan gerrymandering will favor 
Republicans in states under Republican political control, and will favor 
Democrats in states that are under Democratic political control. In Lamone v. 
Benisek, the Maryland companion case to Rucho, extreme partisan gerrymander-
ing gave a dramatic advantage to Democrats over Republicans in the state’s U.S. 
House of Representatives congressional delegation.175 Democrats secured seven 
of eight House seats despite never winning more than 65% of the popular vote.176 
Because of racial bloc voting, the vote also had the effect of preventing whites 
from increasing their political advantage over racial minorities in selecting 
Maryland delegates to the House. 
172. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
173. See id. at 2491; id. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
174. Racial bloc voting was so high in North Carolina that the courts considering the constitutionality 
of the districts involved in Easley v. Cromartie had difficulty determining whether the gerrymanders at 
issue were racial or partisan. See 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001). 
175. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493. 
176. See id.; id. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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In theory, there is no reason why treating partisan gerrymandering as a nonjus-
ticiable political question should favor Republicans and whites over Democrats 
and racial minorities. But in practice, most state legislatures and governorships 
in the United States are currently controlled by Republicans rather than 
Democrats.177 
See Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/WN3K-6TXJ 
(last updated Feb. 3, 2020); Governor (State Executive Office), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Governor_(state_executive_office)#Partisan_breakdown [https://perma.cc/XFK3-WLSM] (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2020). 
That means that the Supreme Court’s current rule treating partisan 
gerrymanders as nonjusticiable political questions will benefit Republicans and 
whites more than it benefits Democrats and racial minorities. In the event that the 
Republican advantage changes over time, the Supreme Court conservative voting 
bloc can change the justiciability rule governing partisan gerrymanders if it so 
desires. After all, the current nonjusticiability rule is of relatively recent vintage. 
Under the 1986 Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Bandemer, partisan gerry-
mandering claims were deemed to be justiciable.178 The Court seriously ques-
tioned the continued vitality of that rule in 2004 with its plurality vote in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer.179 And then Chief Justice Roberts substituted the new nonjusticiability 
rule in Rucho.180 Perhaps the justiciability rule for partisan gerrymanders will 
continue to evolve over time in ways that remain politically correlated. 
The Court’s nonjusticiability deference to partisan gerrymandering can help 
white Republicans maintain their electoral advantage over racial-minority 
Democrats. On the surface, this would seem to have racial overtones only in geo-
graphic electoral areas that have significant minority populations whose interests 
can be subordinated to the interests of whites. In racially homogenous areas, 
where voter populations are essentially all white, partisan gerrymanders should 
be wholly political in nature. Racial motivations should be absent because there 
will be no significant racial minorities whose interest need to be suppressed. That 
may be true in a superficial sense, but subterranean racial concerns may still be 
present. 
The high correlation that exists between race and political affiliation means 
that political parties tend to acquire racial valances. After the Civil War and 
emancipation, the Republican Party became the party of Lincoln, and Southern 
Democrats became the party of slavery and Jim Crow racial segregation. Now, 
Democrats have come to be associated with diversity and the protection of racial- 
minority interests, while Republicans have come to be associated with racial 
homogeneity and opposition to civil rights. This can be starkly illustrated by com-
paring the racially divisive 2020 presidential campaign of Donald Trump to the 
177. 
178. See 478 U.S. 109, 125–27 (1986) (finding that a partisan gerrymandering claim did not raise 
nonjusticiable political question but rather was justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
rejecting view that racial gerrymandering claims are distinguishable from partisan gerrymandering 
claims with respect to justiciability). 
179. See 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004) (plurality opinion); cf. id. at 306–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that some partisan gerrymandering claims might be justiciable). 
180. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
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racially inclusive campaigns of virtually all of Trump’s Democratic chal-
lengers.181 
See, e.g., Julia Cherner, 2020 Democrats Attack Trump’s Response to El Paso and Dayton 
Shootings, CBS NEWS (Aug 5, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/2020-democrats- 
attack-trumps-response-to-el-paso-dayton-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/VT45-TSYT]; Astead W. 
Herndon & Jennifer Medina, Trump Sets the Terms on Racial Division. Do Democrats Know What to 
Do?, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/21/us/politics/trump-race- 
democrats.html; Toluse Olorunnipa & Ashley Parker, ‘Everything that We Hold Dear’: From Race to 
Plastic Straws, Trump Dials Up Culture Wars in Divisive Play for 2020 Votes, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 
2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-dials-up-culture-wars-in-divisive- 
play-for-2020-votes/2019/08/12/8c5c2a96-b556-11e9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html.
It seems likely that white Republican states will have predictable 
views on political issues such as D.C. statehood, affirmative action, and immigra-
tion, even if their minority populations are small. 
As a result of these racial valances, even in electoral areas where whites consti-
tute a large segment of the population, Supreme Court deference to partisan ger-
rymandering is likely to have the net effect of advancing Republican racial 
policies over Democratic racial policies. That means that, even in white electoral 
areas, when the Supreme Court defers to Republican political policies by deem-
ing partisan gerrymanders to be nonjusticiable, it is also deferring to the 
Republican racial policies that those partisan gerrymanders encompass. 
The Supreme Court’s Shaw and Miller rule treating racial gerrymandering 
claims as justiciable also has a disproportionately adverse effect on racial minor-
ities. The Shaw cause of action permits voters living in racially gerrymandered 
voting districts to challenge the constitutionality of those districts as products of 
racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause.182 Again, in theory 
there is no reason to think that the Shaw cause of action should have a dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on racial minorities, or on the Democratic candidates 
whom racial minorities tend to support. Voters can complain that their voting dis-
tricts have been racially engineered to their disadvantage regardless of their race. 
But once again, as a practical matter, most traditional Shaw challenges are 
asserted by white voters who object to being assigned to majority-minority dis-
tricts.183 Even more recent “packing” and “cracking” claims filed by racial- 
minority voters tend to argue that racial-minority votes have been diluted by ex-
cessive concentration in a small number of districts, or by excessive dispersion 
over too many districts, either of which can reduce the ability of minority voters 
to elect the representatives of their choice.184 
181. 
 
182. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–44, 649 (1993). 
183. In the wake of Shaw, most of the Supreme Court’s racial gerrymandering cases were decided in 
ways that favored white interests and disfavored the electoral interests of racial minorities. See SPANN, 
supra note 162, at 155; see generally id. at 107–55 (discussing several relevant voting rights cases). 
Most Supreme Court cases during this period also rejected statutory claims of minority vote dilution 
asserted under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See id. at 85–107; id. at 162–63 (presenting a voting chart 
showing racially correlated case outcomes). 
184. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465–66, 1472, 1476, 1478, 1481–82 (2017) 
(holding that packing superfluous black voters into district constituted unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander that diluted black voting strength); see also THEODORE M. SHAW, THE SUPREME COURT’S 
ELECTION AND REDISTRICTING LAW RECONSIDERED 4–15 (n.d.), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/ 
files/upload_documents/The-Supreme-Court-Election-Law-and-Redistricting.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHM2- 
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FPC6] (discussing recent Supreme Court cases that have ruled on efforts to pack minority voters in ways 
that would reduce minority voting strength, often invalidating such efforts); Michael S. Kang, The End of 
Challenges to Partisan Gerrymandering, REG. REV. (July 17, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/ 
07/17/kang-end-challenges-partisan-gerrymandering/ [https://perma.cc/UF6W-YMGS] (describing the 
difference between “packing” and “cracking”); Kim Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black 
People of Political Power, WASH. POST (June 9, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2016/06/09/how-a-widespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually- 
harm-them/?utm_term=.07899963cf0e (describing how Republicans use packing, rather than more 
conventional cracking, to dilute the black vote). 
As a result, the Supreme Court’s treatment of racial gerrymandering claims as 
justiciable in the redistricting context tends to harm the interests of racial-minor-
ity voters and advance the interests of white voters. Shaw and Miller illustrate 
this tendency. In both cases, the Court entertained challenges by white plaintiffs 
who sought to nullify electoral benefits that the Voting Rights Act gave racial 
minorities to compensate for past voter discrimination.185 Because racial gerry-
mandering claims are justiciable, the Supreme Court can uphold or reject Shaw 
challenges on the merits. Once again, the Court is likely to do so in accordance 
with the political and ideological views of the Justices who comprise the Court’s 
dominant voting bloc. Accordingly, it is not at all surprising that cases like Shaw 
and Miller end up being 5–4, politically correlated decisions. 
The political question doctrine is not the only justiciability doctrine the 
Supreme Court has applied in a way that benefits whites at the expense of racial 
minorities. I have previously argued that the Supreme Court’s notoriously prob-
lematic doctrine of standing is so racially correlated that it seems to be “color 
coded.”186 When racial minorities “file programmatic challenges to widespread 
patterns of racial discrimination, the Court typically denies standing” on one or 
more of a variety of technical grounds relating to particularized injury, causation, 
or redressability.187 But when whites “file similar programmatic challenges to af-
firmative action programs, the Court typically grants standing” by applying the 
technical requirements with relaxed stringency.188 In this regard, it is worth not-
ing that the Supreme Court found standing in Shaw for white plaintiffs who 
wished to challenge majority-minority voting districts, even though it was diffi-
cult to identify any injury suffered by those plaintiffs that did not rest on and rein-
force the very same racial stereotypes that the Shaw majority said it created the 
Shaw cause of action to prevent.189 
When the Supreme Court has discretion in matters affecting race relations, it 
tends to exercise that discretion in ways that favor the interests of whites over the 
interests of racial minorities. That is not an appropriate role for the Court to play 
in a representative democracy. The Court should instead enforce the concept of 
racial equality as one of the structural mechanisms that promote democratic self- 
governance. Nevertheless, the Court does often seem to favor the interests of 
185. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633–39; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921–27 (1995). 
186. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422 (1995). 
187. Id. at 1424. 
188. See id. at 1422–25. 
189. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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whites over the interests of racial minorities. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why the 
Supreme Court would have invented the Shaw cause of action to begin with, other 
than to disadvantage minorities in the electoral process. That is particularly true 
because UJO had already rejected white vote-dilution claims as not plausibly 
depriving whites of equal access to the electoral process.190 But the Supreme 
Court has a long history of sacrificing racial-minority interests to benefit the white 
majority. 
B. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COURT 
In holding that partisan gerrymanders were nonjusticiable, the Rucho Court 
rejected its earlier precedent in Davis v. Bandemer, which had held that partisan 
gerrymanders were justiciable.191 The Supreme Court initially intervened to over-
ride the gerrymandering policy adopted by the political branches, but then it 
changed course and subsequently deferred to the political branches. Throughout 
its history, the Court has vacillated in and out of politics. It has sometimes 
deferred to politics, and other times intervened to override actions of the political 
branches. But it does seem to have been largely consistent along another dimen-
sion: the Supreme Court tends to rule against racial minorities. The Court appears 
to believe that one of its social functions is to protect the interests of whites 
against the competing interests of racial minorities. And if history is any indica-
tion, the Court has become disturbingly good at performing that function.192 
In the beginning, the United States was unambiguously committed to the sacri-
fice of minority interests for the benefit of whites. A rationalizing belief in the 
racial inferiority of blacks was central to maintaining the brutal regime of chattel 
slavery in the American South.193 A racial caste system helped prevent oppressed 
black and white laborers from forming alliances that would threaten the economic 
interests of slaveowners.194 A sense of white supremacy was also central to the 
genocide and forced relocation of indigenous Indians, and to the passage of laws 
that discriminated against Chinese, Mexican, and Irish workers.195 
190. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
191. See 478 U.S. 109, 118–27 (1986). 
192. I have long believed that a tacit social function of the Supreme Court has been to facilitate the 
protection of white interests at racial-minority expense. See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST 
THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 4–5, 94–99, 104–18 
(1993) [hereinafter SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT]; Spann, supra note 186, at 1422–25; Girardeau 
A. Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1025, 1028–29. 
193. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing 
treatment of free blacks in the eighteenth century); SCOTT L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE 
AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE 191 (2000) (discussing the development of racial attitudes in the 
United States); ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 94–97 
(1982) (describing how the degradation and brutal treatment of slaves provided psychological benefits to 
slaveowners). 
194. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 22–26 (2010). 
195. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 193, at 508–10; RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY 
OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 146, 171–72, 200–01, 233 (1993). 
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The Supreme Court turned out to be complicit in legitimizing these early forms 
of racial oppression, with some of its decisions becoming infamous. In Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, the Court deferred to the federal political process and protected 
slaveowner rights under fugitive slave provisions of the Constitution and a federal 
statute.196 Prigg invalidated a Pennsylvania law that required the use of the judi-
cial process, rather than the violent removal from the state by force, to determine 
the status of someone alleged to be an escaped slave.197 The Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of the Pennsylvania statute permitted the continued kidnapping of 
free blacks who were falsely alleged to be slaves, as was depicted in the autobio-
graphical book and Academy Award winning film 12 Years a Slave.198 
In Dred Scot v. Sandford, the Supreme Court overrode the federal political pro-
cess and invalidated on constitutional grounds the Missouri Compromise Act of 
1820, which was an attempted political solution to the nation’s vexing problem of 
slavery.199 In the process of invalidating the federal statute, the Court announced 
that black people could not be citizens of the United States or of the states within 
which they resided.200 Dred Scott is often said to have inflamed racial and re-
gional tensions that ultimately culminated in the Civil War.201 The case was polit-
ically overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment grant of citizenship to “[a]ll 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof.”202 
After the Civil War, Congress passed three Reconstruction constitutional 
amendments and a series of Reconstruction statutes that were designed to abolish 
slavery and provide a measure of equal rights for racial minorities. However, the 
Supreme Court narrowly construed some of those amendments, and invalidated 
some of those statutes in ways that preserved the privileged status that whites pos-
sessed over racial minorities. The Court even permitted the South to impose on 
blacks a functional substitute for slavery through systems of peonage and convict 
labor.203 One of the Court’s most far-reaching decisions was the Civil Rights 
Cases, in which it invalidated the public accommodations provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 under a new “state action” requirement, thereby prohibiting 
Congress from providing a remedy for private acts of discrimination that were 
ubiquitous in the southern states.204 
196. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
197. See id. at 608, 611, 613, 625–26 (1842). 
198. See SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE (David Wilson ed., 2014); 12 YEARS A 
SLAVE (Regency Enterprises et al., 2013). 
199. See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. XIV. 
200. See id. at 404–05, 407. 
201. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 191–93 (1992). 
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
203. See ALEXANDER, supra note 194, at 30–40, 197, 205; DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY 
ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO 
WORLD WAR II 36, 39, 53–54, 56, 58, 274, 359 (2008); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 61–97 (2004). 
204. See 109 U.S. 3, 8–19 (1883). 
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As a result of the Court’s invalidation of federal Reconstruction efforts, the 
South was able to impose on blacks a Jim Crow regime of brutal segregation. The 
Supreme Court, once again, then changed track and deferred to politics and 
upheld the so-called separate-but-equal regime of racial segregation in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.205 The Supreme Court nominally brought an end to separate-but-equal 
segregation by overruling Plessy in its 1954 Brown v. Board of Education deci-
sion.206 But Brown has been at least as problematic as it was helpful. Brown was 
supposed to desegregate the public schools and end the government’s use of 
racial classifications, but thanks to subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Brown 
has done neither. Schools remain badly segregated, and racial profiling remains a 
common practice by police and airport security personnel.207 
One of the reasons that Brown has had such limited success in promoting racial 
equality is that that Court has given itself a broad range of discretion in determin-
ing what constitutes school “desegregation.” In Brown II, decided the year after 
the original 1954 Brown decision, the Court rejected a requirement of immediate 
desegregation and instead required desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”208 
Brown II ushered in a ten-year period of massive resistance to desegregation in 
the South, which delayed any meaningful southern school desegregation until the 
Department of Health and Human Services threatened the withholding of federal 
education funds under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for southern schools that 
resisted.209 
When the school desegregation effort began to move north and west, the 
Supreme Court exercised its “desegregation” discretion in a way that would allow 
the public schools to remain de facto segregated. The Court’s 1973 decision in 
Keyes v. School District No. 1 prohibited the use of race-conscious remedies to 
eliminate the de facto segregation that was produced by private (rather than state) 
action.210 De facto segregation was the most common form of school segregation 
that existed outside the South.211 
See id. at 218–19, 222–23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); GEOFFREY R. 
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501–03 (8th ed. 2018); Judith Rosenbaum, De Facto Segregation 
in the North: Introductory Essay, JEWISH WOMEN’S ARCHIVE, https://jwa.org/teach/livingthelegacy/de- 
facto-segregation-in-north-introductory-essay [https://perma.cc/HWH3-KRFQ] (last visited Feb. 8, 
2010). 
In the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley, the 
Court largely prohibited interdistrict remedies for school segregation.212 Because 
school segregation in the North and West was caused primarily by residential- 
housing segregation that was reflected in school district zones, most minority stu-
dents attended inner-city schools and most white students attended suburban 
205. See 163 U.S. 537, 544–52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
206. See 347 U.S. at 494–95. 
207. See SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 192, at 104–10. 
208. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
209. See SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 192, at 98. 
210. See 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973). 
211. 
212. See 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974); id. at 789–90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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schools.213 As a practical matter, that meant that no actual school integration was 
possible under Milliken. 
The Court’s decisions in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler and 
Freeman v. Pitts held that any schools that had been desegregated under Brown 
and then resegregated as a result of shifts in residential housing patterns, did not 
have to be desegregated again.214 And in Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court went so far as to hold that public 
schools could not even voluntarily use race-conscious methods to remedy de 
facto resegregation.215 In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts perversely 
cited Brown for the proposition that the resegregated schools had to remain 
resegregated.216 
The Supreme Court has also used its loosely constrained discretion to advance 
the interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities in areas outside of the 
school-desegregation context. The Court has sometimes shown sympathy for 
racial affirmative action that was designed to remedy past discrimination or to 
promote prospective diversity in an educational context. For example, in Grutter 
v. Bollinger, the Court upheld an affirmative action plan designed to increase stu-
dent diversity at the University of Michigan Law School.217 However, on the 
same day, the Court held unconstitutional in Gratz v. Bollinger an affirmative 
action plan that was used to increase student diversity at the University of 
Michigan undergraduate college.218 Although the two plans were strikingly simi-
lar, the Court found that the undergraduate plan was not narrowly tailored enough 
to survive equal protection scrutiny.219 The juxtaposition of those two decisions, 
which reach different outcomes under strikingly similar sets of facts, illustrates 
how much unconstrained discretion the Supreme Court has in ruling on the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action.220 
The Supreme Court issued a particularly troubling affirmative action decision 
in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.221 In Schuette, the Court 
upheld a Michigan ballot initiative that amended the state constitution to ban af-
firmative action.222 Using language reminiscent of the language the Court uses 
213. See, e.g., id. at 725–27 (majority opinion). 
214. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 
424, 425 (1976). 
215. 551 U.S. 701, 709–11 (plurality opinion). 
216. See id. at 709–11, 720–25, 733–35, 743 (2007) (plurality opinion); cf. id. at 861–63 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that race-conscious remedies invalidated by the Court may be necessary to prevent 
resegregation). 
217. 539 U.S. 306, 327–30, 334 (2003). 
218. 539 U.S. 244, 255–57, 275–76 (2003). 
219. Id. at 275–76. 
220. On a superficial level, Grutter and Gratz could be characterized as distinguishable because 
Grutter entailed the holistic consideration of race, and Gratz entailed a mechanical consideration of 
race. As I have argued elsewhere, however, that suggested distinction does not withstand more careful 
scrutiny. See Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 242–49 (2004); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 652–56 (2005). 
221. 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
222. Id. at 314–15. 
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when invoking the political question doctrine, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opin-
ion found a need to defer to the preferences of Michigan voters with respect to 
the desirability of affirmative action.223 That was because the U.S. Constitution 
allocated such racial policy determinations to the democratic process.224 Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion viewed the issue in terms that were even starker. He 
said: 
It has come to this. Called upon to explore the jurisprudential twilight zone 
between two errant lines of precedent, we confront a frighteningly bizarre 
question: Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bid what its text plainly requires? Needless to say (except that this case obliges 
us to say it), the question answers itself.225 
Not only did the political-policy nature of the issue require deference to 
Michigan voters, but the Michigan voters themselves simply insisted on the pro-
spective race neutrality that was already required by the Constitution. 
However, the Michigan ballot initiative was far from neutral. The Supreme 
Court had already held in cases like Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and 
Grutter that racial affirmative action plans could satisfy constitutional strict scru-
tiny only if they were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est.226 That means that the Michigan anti-affirmative action initiative only 
applied to affirmative action plans that, by hypothesis, were necessary to advance 
a compelling governmental interest by compensating for past discrimination or 
providing prospective diversity. Affirmative action plans that did not satisfy that 
standard would already be unconstitutional. So, the policy that the Michigan vot-
ers were adopting was a policy that precluded remedial efforts to restore some 
semblance of racial equality to racial minorities. 
Another way to state this is that the Michigan voters had adopted a ballot initia-
tive that was designed to make sure that whites retained their existing advantage 
over racial minorities with respect to the distribution of resources that fell within 
the scope of whatever affirmative action plan was at issue. By upholding the bal-
lot initiative, therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the desire of Michigan vot-
ers to retain the advantage that whites possessed over racial minorities was 
constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court was accepting the current maldis-
tribution of resources as part of the baseline from which equal protection determi-
nations would be made. Equality, therefore, encompassed white advantage over 
racial minorities. 
The Court has also been quite clear about two other features that it will not tol-
erate in affirmative action plans. First, in applying strict scrutiny to an affirmative 
223. See id. at 310–12. 
224. See id. at 309–15. 
225. See id. at 316 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
226. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
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action plan set aside for minority construction contractors, the Court in Adarand 
refused to distinguish between benign and invidious racial classifications, apply-
ing strict scrutiny to both.227 In his dissent, Justice Stevens characterized Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion as being unable to distinguish a “No Trespassing 
sign” from “a welcome mat.”228 Second, in Grutter, the Court emphatically 
insisted that affirmative action plans could not utilize quotas, because “[t]hat 
would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.”229 
The prohibition is difficult to understand because in a race-neutral, nondiscrimi-
natory, colorblind society, we would expect resources to be distributed in a 
racially balanced way. It is difficult to see what is wrong with directly pursuing 
an important goal that we all claim to share. The suggestion that only race-neutral 
measures can be used to remedy injuries that have been inflicted through race- 
conscious discrimination reveals a disturbing imbalance that itself constitutes a 
form of discrimination favoring whites over racial minorities. 
Voter fraud has been a controversial issue about which both Republicans and 
Democrats have complained in recent years. Republicans claim that blacks, in-
digenous Indians, and Latinx immigrants are casting illegal votes that help 
Democratic candidates. As a result, Republicans wish to engage in vigorous anti-
fraud activities such as adopting voter ID laws, relocating polling places, and lim-
iting voting hours.230 
Racially motivated voter-fraud initiatives, and other minority-voter suppression measures, have 
been heavily funded and coordinated by conservative billionaires such as the Koch brothers, as have 
efforts to engage in partisan gerrymandering that reduces diversity and segregates voters in voting 
districts, thereby giving Republicans a significantly disproportionate share of electoral power. See JANE 
MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL 
RIGHT 328–32, 333–53 (2016). For example, in an October 29, 2018 New Yorker comment, Jelani Cobb 
put Georgia gubernatorial candidate Brian Kemp’s voter-suppression efforts during the 2018 election in 
the context of Kemp’s previous voter-suppression efforts as Georgia Secretary of State. See Jelani Cobb, 
Voter Suppression Tactics in the Age of Trump, NEW YORKER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2018/10/29/voter-suppression-tactics-in-the-age-of-trump. Cobb also put those efforts in 
the context of the more general voter-suppression efforts that have been practiced by the Republican 
Party in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder. Id. Shelby County 
freed states with a history of voter discrimination from the obligation to get changes to their voting 
procedures approved by the Justice Department or a federal court. Cobb stressed that the 2018 midterm 
elections were not only a referendum on the Trump Presidency, but also on the effectiveness of voter- 
suppression electoral restrictions. See id. As if to illustrate Cobb’s point, in the final days before the 
2018 midterm elections, President Trump, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Brian Kemp, and other 
Republican candidates continued to raise fears of voter fraud. See, e.g., Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, 
Brian Kemp’s Office, Without Citing Evidence, Investigates Georgia Democrats over Alleged ‘Hack,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/georgia-elections-kemp- 
voters-hack.html. The absence of any genuine voter-fraud danger caused the Republican focus on voter 
fraud to be interpreted by many as an effort to intimidate legitimate minority and immigrant voters with 
a fear of arrest and prosecution. See Amy Gardner, Without Evidence, Trump and Sessions Warn of 




Democrats view those efforts as blatant attempts to 
227. See 515 U.S. at 223–27. 
228. See id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
229. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30. 
230. 
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intimidate and disenfranchise legitimate minority voters.231 
See Amy Gardner, GOP Claims of Voter Fraud Threat Fuel Worries About Ballot Access in 
November, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2018, 3:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
crackdowns-on-potential-voter-fraud-fuel-worries-about-ballot-access-in-november/2018/10/13/764db3 
88-c0cd-11e8-be77-516336a26305_story.html?utm_term=.bffd396e1a12&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1 
(explaining that GOP officials try to suppress minority vote in name of preventing supposed voter 
fraud); William Wan, North Carolina’s Battle over Voting Rights Intensifies, WASH. POST (May 29, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/north-carolinas-battle-over-voting-rights-intensifies/ 
2017/05/29/7c9fa05e-4214-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html?utm_term=.f26aa7f42b9b (noting that 
Democrats and voting-rights activists have resisted Republican efforts to suppress minority voting in the 
name of curtailing alleged voter fraud); Editorial Board, Voter Suppression Is the Civil Rights Issue of 
This Era, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/voter-suppression- 
is-the-civil-rights-issue-of-this-era/2017/08/19/926c8b58-81f3-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html? 
utm_term=.32c205e05bc4 (arguing that there is a need to stop Republican efforts to roll back minority 
voting rights). 
The Supreme Court 
has yet to rule on most of the competing voter-fraud and voter-suppression 
claims. But the Court has issued one decision. In Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board, the Supreme Court ruled in a way that benefitted white 
Republicans by upholding an Indiana voter-ID law.232 
In the political context surrounding the Crawford litigation, many people 
viewed the Indiana voter-ID law as an effort to suppress minority voting. But in 
his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens said that the record did not support that con-
clusion.233 He did, however, end his opinion by suggesting that additional evi-
dence of racial or partisan voter suppression might produce a different 
outcome.234 A subsequent interview with Justice Stevens revealed that his knowl-
edge of facts surrounding the Indiana voter-ID law that were not in the record 
gave him concerns about the law’s constitutionality, but he did not feel as if he 
could consider evidence that was outside the record.235 
See Robert Barnes, Stevens Says Supreme Court Decision on Voter ID Was Correct, but Maybe 
Not Right, WASH. POST (May 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/stevens- 
says-supreme-court-decision-on-voter-id-was-correct-but-maybe-not-right/2016/05/15/9683c51c-193f- 
11e6-9e16-2e5a123aac62_story.html?utm_term=.e16f5165eebc.
One of the Supreme Court decisions that most explicitly provides an advantage 
to white voters is Shelby County v. Holder, which effectively invalidated the sec-
tion 5 preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.236 Congress 
enacted the Voting Rights Act to help remedy a long history of voting discrimina-
tion against blacks and other racial minorities.237 Its section 5 preclearance provi-
sion required prior federal approval before a jurisdiction with a history of voting 
discrimination could make any changes to its voting procedures.238 Section 4 of 
the Act prescribed a formula for determining whether a jurisdiction was covered 
by the section 5 preclearance requirement.239 The Act had strong bipartisan 
231. 
232. See 553 U.S. 181, 200–04 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
233. See id. at 202. 
234. See id. at 203–04. 
235. 
 
236. See 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
237. Id. at 529. 
238. See id. at 534–35. 
239. Id. at 529. 
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support, and it had been repeatedly renewed by Congress, most recently in 2006, 
for another twenty-five years.240 However, because the same section 4 formula 
had been in effect since the Act was first adopted in 1965, Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for a 5–4 majority, held that section 4 was unconstitutionally stale in light 
of population and voting statistics changes that had occurred since the Act’s ini-
tial adoption.241 Without a functioning section 4 formula to determine which 
jurisdictions were covered, the section 5 preclearance requirement could not be 
applied. 
The Shelby County decision was disheartening. As Justice Ginsburg docu-
mented in her dissent, section 5 preclearance was working remarkably well to 
help reverse the long history of racial discrimination in voting.242 The Court’s 
invalidation of section 4 put a stop to this. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Shelby County, legislatures in Republican states have adopted a flood of voter-ID 
laws and other measures that suppress minority voting.243 
See, e.g., JONATHAN BRATER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., PURGES: A GROWING THREAT TO 
THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2018), https://t.e2ma.net/click/zmf14/z2fk8r/7chmlp [https://perma.cc/LC2U- 
MESF]; Tiffany D. Cross, Purging Voters of Color Is on the Rise, BEAT DC (July 25, 2018), https:// 
www.thebeatdc.com/blog/2018/7/25/purging-voters-of-color-is-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/WV36- 
PN5T] (noting that the July 2018 Brennan Center report showed states with history of discrimination 
have purged black and Latinx voters from polls, despite lack of in-person voter fraud); Sari Horwitz, 
North Carolina Voter-ID Case Could Have Ramifications Across U.S., WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-carolina-voter-id-case-could-have- 
ramifications-across-us/2016/01/25/0a70c888-c384-11e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html (noting that 
many Republican states passed voter-ID laws that disproportionately reduce minority voting after 
Shelby County v. Holder effectively invalidated the section 5 preclearance provision of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965); Kira Lerner, Native Americans’ Right to Vote Is Under Attack, THINKPROGRESS 
(June 20, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/for-native-americans-the-right-to-vote-is-under- 
attack-f667a402d63c/ [https://perma.cc/3KTY-NFEG] (explaining that voter-ID and other laws have 
disproportionately suppressed voting by indigenous Indians); Vann R. Newkirk II, How Voter ID Laws 
Discriminate, ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how- 
voter-id-laws-discriminate-study/517218/ (explaining that voter-ID laws passed by Republican 
legislatures double the turnout gap between white and Latinx voters in general elections, and almost 
double the turnout gap between whites and blacks in primary elections); Bryan Pietsch, Tribal Leaders 
Tell Senate Voting Barriers Are Persistent, Systemic, AZ DAILY SUN (July 19, 2018), https://azdailysun. 
com/news/local/tribal-leaders-tell-senate-voting-barriers-are-persistent-systemic/article_d2e10421-49e4- 
53a0-b3a6-31eaf52dd794.html (same). 
In a real sense, the 
Supreme Court in Crawford and Shelby County became an active participant in 
the suppression of racial-minority voting. 
This is just a sampling of the many cases in which past and present Supreme 
Courts have exercised their discretion in ways that advance the interests of whites 
at the expense of racial minorities. There is a reason why the Court would be 
inclined to favor white interests over racial-minority interests. Most Supreme 
Court justices are white. Most share the prevailing values of the society in which 
they have been acculturated. Throughout its history, the prevailing value that 
U.S. culture has embraced is the value that white interests matter more than 
240. See id. at 536, 538–39. 
241. See id. at 551, 553, 557. 
242. See id. at 573–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
243. 
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racial-minority interests. That, of course, is not a stated value in U.S. culture. But 
the advantage that whites incessantly have over racial minorities in the distribu-
tion of societal resources proclaims that it is a tacit value of U.S. culture. If 
Supreme Court Justices share the values of the culture that has placed them on 
that Court, they are likely to respond to those values, either consciously or uncon-
sciously, when they adjudicate cases that come before them. Knowing this, we 
insist that adherence to the rule of law will insulate Supreme Court decisions 
from the cultural biases and predispositions that the Justices have necessarily 
internalized over the course of their lives. But if, as in the case of justiciability 
and gerrymandering, the doctrine is too imprecise to impose any meaningful con-
straint on the exercise of judicial discretion, the doctrinal safeguard will not 
work. And the Supreme Court will serve the social function of advancing the 
interests of whites at the expense of racial minorities.244 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has gerrymandered the law of justiciability in a way that 
continues a long Supreme Court tradition of sacrificing the interests of racial 
minorities in order to advance the interests of whites. By treating partisan gerry-
mandering as nonjusticiable in Rucho v. Common Cause, and treating racial ger-
rymandering as justiciable in Shaw v. Reno, the Court has acted as if the two 
types of gerrymanders are different. But as the Court recognized in Easley v. 
Cromartie, one can often appear to be the other. Moreover, the Court’s doctrinal 
pairings can easily be inverted to support the conclusion that partisan gerryman-
dering is justiciable and racial gerrymandering is not. This gives the Supreme 
Court a vast amount of unconstrained discretion in ruling on the constitutionality 
of gerrymandering. That poses a problem. 
When the Supreme Court possesses unconstrained judicial discretion, history 
shows that the Court is likely to exercise that discretion in ways that favor the 
interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities. Because most Supreme 
Court Justices have internalized the unstated cultural values that favor whites 
over racial minorities in the United States, protean legal doctrines cannot be 
relied on to insulate the Justices from the influence of those values when they for-
mulate constitutional policy. Indeed, one of the consequences of the Rucho deci-
sion is that it now leaves the white Republicans who control most statehouses and 
governorships in the United States free to engage in unbridled partisan gerryman-
dering that seems certain to help whites and harm racial minorities. That not only 
deprives minorities of their individual rights, but it also creates a structural defect 
in the electoral process that undermines the operation of democratic self-gover-
nance. On paper, at least, that is not how things are supposed to work. 
There are steps that a genuinely neutral Supreme Court could take to address 
the problem of minority underrepresentation in the political process. In an effort 
244. My book-length articulation of this thesis is contained in SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, 
supra note 192. 
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to achieve some semblance of meaningful constraint on the scope of the Court’s 
discretion, it could focus on effects rather than imprecise doctrinal standards in 
enforcing the equality provisions of the Constitution. By requiring racial propor-
tionality in the political process, the Court could insist on equality by the numbers 
rather than a mere rhetorical equality that masked underlying inequities. But the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to do that. As the Court stressed in Grutter, it believes 
that the pursuit of racial balance would be “patently unconstitutional.”245 In the 
final analysis, it may be that the rule-of-law safeguards that are supposed to pro-
tect racial minorities from the discriminatory inclinations of the culture in which 
they live were never intended to provide anything but false hope.  
245. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
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